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Multiple Staging of National Ritual and Identity -
The Case of National Flag-raising in Post-1997 Hong Kong 
Abstract 
The thesis studies the development of national flag-raising ritual in Hong Kong after 
1997. Working in the forefront of the nation building project, the ritual is one of the 
efficacious spectrums to frame and demonstrate the nationalization of Hong Kong, 
and her negotiations with a national identity. It argues that, despite being the absolute 
symbol of the nation, national flag-raising ritual cannot transcend the ambivalence 
and hybridity of the identity formation in Hong Kong. Rather, its operation is 
localized, an on-going process of multi-dimensional modifications and applications in 
which the negotiations of the national and the local identity are painstakingly exposed. 
Multiple staging of the ritual is outlined. The double meanings of stage enable us to 
discuss, firstly, the process of localization and settlement of the ritual in Hong Kong; 
secondly, the various sites of its operation. It is by the juxtaposition of the national 
ritual onto the negotiations of national identity, that the excitement of Hong Kong's 
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Chapter One Introduction 
'It is hard to argue with a flag, 
especially if you do not have another flag of your own. ’) 
In the ending remarks of his book Rituals, Politics and Power, Kertzer (1988) 
reiterates the power of symbols, such as national flag, as the dominant force in 
creating a convincing world. In a political ritual of flag-raising, for example, a 
single flag is used to signify the sole nation power. Kertzer's remarks recap the 
fact that it is only by "another" sovereignty, as symbolized by "another flag", that 
the power can be challenged. 
However, Kertzer might find the case of Hong Kong quite an opposite to 
what he proposes. 
In Hong Kong, we do have a flag of our own, but can never argue with 
"another flag" that co-exists in the territory. 
Ever since the five-star red flag was hoisted in the midnight of June 30，1997 
during the handover ceremony，Hong Kong has been raising two flags every 
morning in the Golden Bauhinia Square in Wan Chai as the daily official ritual of 
the Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the People's Republic of China 
(PRC). Both the national flag of the PRC and that of the HKSAR are hoisted. 
Apparently, if to follow Kertzer's thoughts, this is a rather untypical 
arrangement for a typical national flag-raising ritual. For as mentioned, there 
1 David Kertzer (1988), Rituals, Politics and Power, pp. 182 
2 The large-scale ceremony starting June 30，1997 until the start of July 1, 1997 to mark the 
official retreat of the British rule over Hong Kong, the sovereignty transfer to China, and the 
establishment of the Hong Kong Special Adminstrative Region of the People's Republic of China. 
It attracted global attention and was regarded as a media battle of the century (Knight & Nakano, 
1999)，"a momentous day for China" (in a speech of the Hong Kong Chief Executive Tung 
Chee-hwa delivered on the spot); The Prince of Wales of British said it was the important and 
special ceremony to mark a moment of both change and continuity in Hong Kong's history" 
(Knight & Nakano，1999:156) 
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usually allows space of one sole symbolic power. Thanks to the idiosyncratic 
policy of ‘ one-county-two-system，，Hong Kong has a flag of her own, but never 
provokes arguments with that 'another' flag of China. Rather, their co-existence in 
the everyday morning ritual helps convince the credibility of the system. And to a 
larger extent, it marks a new stage of the history of Hong Kong, whose colonial 
past has never carried with it any public ritual of her own in a place without a 
nation. (Ma, 1996; 2000) The flag-raising ritual embodies and reproduces the 
symbols of the national and the SAR flags, and is dominant in creating a 
convincing sense of nationhood, a sentiment called nationalism, for the newly 
decolonized Hong Kong to embrace her own country China. It is regarded as one 
of the most efficacious machinery of the nation-building project in post-1997 
Hong Kong. So, how does this machinery work? 
As exposed by the untypical ritualistic arrangement, the nation building 
project is not carried out without disturbances. The co-existence of the two flags 
symbolizes precisely the co-existence of two separate sovereignties, two different 
political subjectivities, two diverse but somehow intermingled past; the 
co-existence starts with a regulated balance of power upon the sovereignty 
transfer, but soon falls into a shape as unstable as people's political and 
socio-cultural lives. People living under these two flags are facing a tremendous 
challenge of identity confrontation, as they express loyalties to both flags in their 
participations to the ritual. Politicians have commented that, the 1997 sovereignty 
transfer of Hong Kong is about identity instead of sovereignty.^ So, what sorts of 
identity negotiation have been going through in people's lives as reflected by the 
ritual? 
3 Ex-Chief Secretary of Hong Kong Anson Chan, once dubbed the "conscience of Hong Kong", 
made this comment in a speech on June 12，1998 at the Asia Society Annual Dinner in Washington. 
Transcription from the Government Information Service. 
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Weberian thoughts would agree on the instrumentality and rationality of 
flag-raising as upholding nationhood and solidarity. But if one follows the 
Durkheimian trajectories, which are later elaborated by Clifford Geertz, one 
would pay more attention to the symbolic production of flag-raising as such, and 
the creativity of agency (people's ways of life) in interacting culture (symbol) 
with society (social relationships). (Lewis, 2002) In other words, one should probe 
into the process of meaning negotiations around flag-raising, as reflected in how 
flag-raising is symbolically and culturally produced, mediated and adopted by the 
forces of social relationships and the Sino-Hong Kong relationships, in different 
aspects of people's lives. 
The following study thus attempts to juxtapose the national flag-raising ritual 
onto the negotiations of national identification. It focuses on how the ritual is 
developed and settled in Hong Kong after 1997’ to investigate the process of the 
ritual's localization, how it lives up to or strays away from the nationalization of 
the decolonized Hong Kong. It is expected that the excitement of Hong Kong's 
gradual departure from her transitory condition can be captured and documented. 
Contextualized in the postcolonial Hong Kong, flag-raising must be regarded 
as an inter-play between nationalism, symbolic communication and postcolonial 
ambivalence. An appropriate study on this topic must be able to shed lights on, 
theoretically, the notion of nationalism and the problematics arisen in a 
postcolonial perspective; secondly, the notion of political ritual, as a kind of 
symbolic communication, in addressing the first conception. Contextually, the 
study offers empirical data to investigate whether the implantment of the ritual is 
instant and linear. Given the complex postcolonial circumstances in Hong Kong, 
and her longstanding identity crisis, nationalization of Hong Kong might 
experience multi-dimensional modifications and applications in which the 
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negotiations of local identity are painstakingly underway. 
The first part of the thesis gives a literature review from which the theoretical 
framework of the research would be derived. Then, it attempts to develop 
problematics shown in the recent development and controversies around the 
discourse of flag-raising. Major research questions would then be wrapped up. 
Afterwards, flag-raising would be operationalized along the concept of "multiple 
staging" in response to the analysis of empirical data obtained from the year 1997 
to 2004. 
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Chapter Two Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
2.1 Nationalism 
How does a nation come into being? Marxist theory of nationalism situates a 
nation's modem emergence within the global context of capitalist development; 
Ernest Gellner (2001) relates it with the emergence of industrial society; Halim 
Barakat uses his study on the Arab world to suggest that nationalism is a genuine 
result of the internal and external dynamics of the society. (Lazarus, 1999) All of 
which appear deterministic; an evolutionary determinism which regard the rise of 
nations as an inevitable process necessary and beneficial to the development of 
human existence. 
2.1.1 Nationalism and Imagined Communities 
On the other hand, however, there are attempts to explain the formation of nations 
and the spread of nationalism as a construct of modern imagination and historical 
invention~in circumstances that human agency and imagination takes up the key 
role to build up a nation. Nation building, in this way, becomes the ways in which 
nationalism comes out from a form of community, a kind of political discourse 
instead of ideology. This is the definition upheld by Benedict Anderson (1983, 
1991)，who believes in the powerful emotional dimensions of nationalism, where 
people have a cognitive need to be adhered to a membership of a group; the need 
is a universal, psychological need to belong. Political structures and discourses of 
nation-states and common citizenship, for example, of symbolic systems such as 
national flags and anthems, are therefore, the "realities" for people to imagine and 
identify a community on a common ground, (ibid.) 
Anderson outlines two major conditions in which imagined communities 
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arise. One is the revolution in the conception of time; another is the emergence of 
print-capitalism. The former locates the changes of the medieval conception of 
time, that is, the past prefigures the future through divine Providence, to a modern 
conception, where time becomes "measurable" by the use of clock and calendar, 
and that time is homogenous and linear. Correspondingly, nature of rituals 
changes too, from one of religious and prophesy making, to become 
commemoration and maintenance of continued narrative. Here, ritual becomes an 
important delivery of an imagined bonding, a "shared experience" among people 
who from the beginning to the end are anonymous to each other. But it is among 
this very disconnection, that a sense of nationhood is nurtured, because: 
Yet each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is 
being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of 
whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the 
slightest notion. Furthermore, this ceremony is incessantly repeated at 
daily or half-daily intervals throughout the calendar. What more vivid 
figure for the secular, historically clocked, imagined community can be 
envisioned? (Anderson, 1983:39-40) 
The cognition of the simultaneous existence of thousands or millions of 
participants/ members of the same community is only made possible by the 
modern conception of homogeneous time. 
Prior to the participation of ritual is the printed text that creates the "shared 
experience" for the introduction and dissemination of discourses of nation. From 
the woodblock and movable type printing that Anderson describes, to the 
contemporary media text of newspaper, broadcasting and other literary forms, the 
technology creates the nation as a "print-community". The community is bound 
by the spreading of printed information which narrates an imagined time and 
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space for people to commonly identify (again, despite this reading public never 
meet or know each other). To Anderson, a nation is a series of narratives by 
print-language, a series of reading, explanation or even deconstruction of the text 
by the imagination of the reading collectives. The author can be both the 
print-language (such as newspaper, and later developed into the modern mass 
media in general), and the symbol system (such as the national flag). The 
community becomes the reader/audience. Not surprisingly, contemporary media 
scholars have continued to develop Anderson's conception of nationalism 
alongside with the growing influence of mass media, and conclude "nation lives 
not only in historical time but also in media time." (Carey, 1998:44) Nation is a 
historical continuum as well as a material (media) product. From this perspective, 
as Smith (1993) suggests, a nation becomes a kind of modern "text", and 
nationalism a form of political "discourse"; to read and explain the power of the 
text and discourse relies on the devices employed by the nationalists/ elites in 
their modeling of "nation-ness". 
2.1.2 Nationalism and Invented Tradition 
On the same token, a nation can also be "invented". Eric Hobsbawm (1992) 
suggests that in periods of rapid social changes such as colonial takeover and 
decolonization in modern societies, there is a need to create order and sense of 
community. New needs arisen from the new order are to be satisfied with the 
invention of "new tradition", that is, to establish a continuum with a past but at the 
same time, adapt the past to new situations, in particular, rapid social changes 
which urgently need to be controlled. In his study of Europe and America from 
1870 to 1914，Hobsbawm observes means as such: creative of institutions like 
festivals, invention of new status systems and modes of socialization like 
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education and royal ceremonial, and the formation of a "community" such as the 
nation which symbolizes social cohesion and membership. (Hobsbawm, 1992; 
Smith, 1993) In other words, identity of a nation such as France, and being the 
French, is embedded with historical continuities and developments, as much as 
with some "invented" components of narrating the nation and the identity along 
the continuities. But as Smith maintains, tradition, myths, history and symbols 
"must all grow out of the existing, living memories and beliefs of the people who 
are to compose the nation. Their popular resonance will be greater the more 
continuous with the living past they are shown to be." (Smith, 1993:16) How 
invention comes out of the reconstruction of the living past and symbol systems 
become the crucial factor in nation building. 
In short, the intellectual framework of both Anderson and Hobsbawm can be 
generalized into some points of departure for the following study of Hong Kong. 
Firstly, nationalism becomes problematic particularly in times of significant 
historical twist and rapid social change. Thus, nation building is defined as the 
essential social engineering. To realize this social goal, the use of narratives and 
symbol systems with tailored discourse is deployed, to create, re-create and 
narrate a sense of collectivity that satisfies the universal cognitive need of people 
adherence to a community. The community, which is proven to be imaginable 
through the narration and reading of a common text, is where a nation can be 
located, invented, imagined, or reconstructed. 
In this way, the study of Hong Kong national ritual of flag-raising after the 
sovereignty return to China in 1997 departs from the above framework. From a 
transition of colonization to decolonization, Hong Kong has to experience a 
socio-political twist of returning to a nation's rule. Nation building project is put 
forth after 1997 to establish Hong Kong's legitimacy of being a part of China. 
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National ritual of flag-raising enters the local symbol system to create the sense of 
nationhood among the Hong Kong people. Hence, to regard nationalism as (1) 
cognitive; (2) a construct of social engineering; (3) narrative; and hence, (4) a 
cultural construct, is the appropriate way to align the flag-raising ritual with 
nation building, and analyze the ways in which the ritual inscribes nationalism in 
the course of this social project. 
On top of this, it is equally essential to contextualize the Hong Kong 
situation against the background of its postcoloniality^ since the fact that Hong 
Kong's 150-year colonization under the British rule co-existed with a close 
connection to her ethnic Chinese origin, has rendered Hong Kong an example of 
unique decolonization. The following sheds light on the problematic of 
nationalism in postcoloniality, and the theoretical framework that contextualizes 
Hong Kong postcoloniality. 
2.1.3 Nationalism and Postcoloniality: The Mimetic Approach 
Major contemporary postcolonial scholars maintain a school of anti-colonial 
nationalism. It goes beyond naive liberation to the witness of different auspices, 
some being problematic, to secure new sense of nationhood and counter-narratives, 
and further to the international self-presence. 
Critical approaches to anti-colonial nationalism maintain it as not only elitist 
and authoritarian, but also a mimetic discourse. Gayatri Spivak (1996) asks the 
famous question ‘can the subaltern speak?' Confronted by her own answer ‘no，， 
she suggests that nation building and nationalism is only representation made by 
the elites; the marginalized subaltern is not given any voice in history. 
‘ B y postcoloniality it does not simply indicates a periodisation of decoloniation, but the cultural 
reaction, experience and situation in face of the decolonized state. 
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Anti-colonial as much as colonial nationalism constructs the subaltern as a 
discursive figure that is by definition incapable of self-representation. Her 
theorization of subalternity focuses on the problematics of representation as 
reading. On her reading, the social practices of 'the people' are always 
inaccessible to the elite classes, who (mis-)represent them in the social discourse 
of nationalism, an elite configuration. This echoes with much of the postcolonial 
studies today, where the subaltern is regarded as the (de-)colonized majority in 
search of an authentic voice in the new phrase of nation building. 
The mimetic approach, on the other hand, encounters the fact that "the 
leaders and ideologues of colonial and semi-colonial liberation movements 
sincerely spoke the language of European nationalism, which they had so often 
learned in or from the west, even when it did not suit their situation." (Hobsbawm, 
1991:136) What Hobsbawm suggests is that, nationalism is in fact the imperialist 
construction in the dependent world. On the same token, Partha Chatterjee 
painstakingly points out, nationalists accepts the same essentialist conception of 
the distinction between "the East" and "the West", the same typology exhibited in 
imperialism, the same "objectifying procedures of knowledge constructed in the 
post-Enlightenment age of Western science as Orientalist thought." (Chatterjee, 
1993:38) Lazarus reads him as saying, 'the moment of decolonization corresponds 
in all instances to a mere restructuring of "Western" hegemony.' (Lazarus, 
1999:124) 
Such awareness leads Chatterjee to theorize anti-colonial nationalism as "a 
different discourse, yet one that is dominated by another." (Chatterjee, 1993:42) 
Nationalists fighting against colonialism seek new political possibilities and 
succeed in producing a discourse different from the colonial one. Yet, as a 
discourse of power it is not enough for them to remain in negation of former 
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domination, but a positive discourse to replace the structure of colonial power 
with a new order, that of national power. Here, Chatterjee is faced by the 
pervasive historicity of imperialism, and asks, "Can nationalist thought produce a 
discourse of order while daring to negate the very foundations of a system of 
knowledge that has conquered the world? How far can it succeed in maintaining 
its difference from a discourse that seeks to dominate it?" (ibid.) He recedes to his 
hypothesis to say that anti-colonial nationalist thought is different yet dominated. 
As we shall see later, the postcoloniality proposed by Homi Bhabha is greatly 
influenced by such formulation, where the dominated and regulated 'difference' of 
the (de-)colonized has long been the employed colonial strategy of mimicry. At 
the same time, understanding nationalism as the maintenance of difference 
explains the endless chain of identification of decolonized speaking subjects with 
the interplay of Self/Other, the new and the old, the fluidity of being both a 
subject and an object. 
Different in thoughts but common in emphasis, the above postcolonial 
scholars all hold a notion of nationalism as a mode of representation. Ideological 
differences between various nationalisms and the material consequences that 
follow from these differences are downplayed. Rather, all nationalisms attempt to 
secure consent for their claims to representativeness ~ but in disturbed power 
hierarchy both internally and externally. All nationalisms strive to represent 
themselves as the true, legitimated voice of the people-as-nation -- despite in 
some case 'the people' is just a discursive tool. Thus, all nationalisms are 
appropriative, which involve the processes of speaking for and silencing. 
One of the more celebrated uses of anti-colonial nationalism as a mimetic 
discourse is to be found in the work of Bhabha. As mentioned, there are much 
similiarites between him and Chatterjee in the conception of colonial subjectivity. 
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To Bhabha (1986), nationalism is a subtle articulation of difference within the 
semiotic space of the same, because "the colonial presence is always ambivalent, 
split between its appearance as original and authoritative, and its articulation as 
repetition and difference." (Bhabha, 1986:169) He terms the former as 
"pedagogical" (originated from historicity), and the latter "performative" (situated 
at the present everyday lives) that create the narrative space of "the people". The 
boundaries of colonial positionality, that is, the division of self/other, the 
differentiation of colonizer and colonized, are made under such ambivalence. 
For Bhabha, the effect of colonial power is to produce neither the submission 
of the colonized, nor the repression of native traditions. Rather, the power is to 
bring about hybridization, or mimicry, that produces a recognizable Other, a 
subject of difference within the sameness, which is always "not quite not white" 
(for example, an Indian trying to be English by playing cricket is simultaneously 
"the same as" English but "perpetually different from" English). To maintain such 
positionality, the difference should be continually maintained. (Bhabha, 1994) 
What is in concern is not the identity of the colonized, but the problematic 
colonial representation of subjects. Based on such problematics and ambivalence, 
he insists that colonial mimicry could as well be destabilizing to colonial power, a 
form of subversion and intervention: ‘Mimicry is at once camouflage, travesty, 
intimidation, and assimilation, a (su)stained imitation through which we are hailed 
into place but also called into question.' (ibid.) Later, Bhabha's mimicry is to be 
re-formulated around the discourse of flag-raising, a rather ambivalent, if possibly 
subversive, act of embracing nationhood (the pedagogical) but at the same time, 
retaining one's own subjectivity (the performative), and how the nature of such 
mimicry undergoes transformation as Hong Kong enters her path of assimilation 
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to the endo-colonizer, China�. 
2.1.4 Postcoloniality and Endo-colonialism 
By postcoloniality, Bhabha defines it against nationalism. (Lazarus, 1999:135) 
His contention is that the problematic of nationalism is exploded, as 'nation' now 
encounters its limits by the emergence of the Other: the migrants, minorities and 
postcolonials who set forth the postcoloniality, who are wandering peoples who 
cannot be contained within one single national culture, but 'are themselves the 
marks of a shifting boundary that alienates the frontiers of the modern nation'. 
(Bhabha, 1990:315) In a sense, postcoloniality could be defined by what he terms 
as ‘unhomeliness，，i.e., ‘the condition of extra-territorial and cross-cultural 
initiations'; and the ever shifting and unfixing boundaries. 
Mediating between colonial reminiscence and the growing sense of 
nationhood of China, Hong Kong has no difficulty to locate such "shifting 
boundaries" of identity. And to foresee Hong Kong's departure with this state of 
"unhomeliness" is to suggest a settlement and affirmation to the implanted 
nationalism. The enforced sense of nationhood, however, is regarded as a form of 
colonialism directed rather internally from China to Hong Kong. Birch et al (2001) 
describes Hong Kong as the "best example" to demonstrate the state of 
"endo-colonialism". In this way, Hong Kong's unhomeliness and her struggle in 
the postcoloniality seems a perpetual deferral. Thus, the following study attempts 
to analyse the national flag-raising ritual as one of the major identifiers to refract 
the trajectory from her postcolonial ambivalence to national settlement. 
2 Endo-colonialism, a form of colonialism directed internally. (Birth et al., 2001:48) 
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2.2 Symbolic Communication and Nation Building 
2.2.1 Political Ritual 
There raises no doubt to locate national flag-raising as a ritual of political origin 
and consequence, if one believes power must be expressed through symbolic 
guise. Ritual is a national essence, it is part of a national symbol system with 
connotative capacity, that is, it goes beyond denotative function of referring to 
empirical events, but to express and convey emotions. (Dittmer & Kim，1993) 
In studying political ritual of this sort, the research adopts the belief that no 
definite definition is to be uncovered for ritual, and that it is rather an analytical 
category that deals with the chaos of human experience and put it coherently 
(Kertzer, 1988). So, it is not going to be a semiotics of ritual, but sociology of 
symbol. It is not going to be an analysis on ritual strategy, rhetoric and grammar; 
but the relationship between ritual and nation building. It is because symbolic 
communication, apart from conveying meanings, confirming values and ideas, 
and enriching emotions, also stimulates action. Symbols are not 'merely symbolic' 
in the sense of being the opposite of real life. They are real life and may become 
vital aspects of a social process. (Mach, 1993) 
We abandon definition-seeking of ritual to identify some common traits of it. 
Scholars have common understanding of ritual as being expressive, regulated, 
stylized, formal, and historical. It is repetitive, soon naturalized, and subject to 
modifications. In particular, Paul Connerton gives a shining point by saying that 
ritual continues to be meaningful in sets of 'further non-ritual actions', extending 
the significance to the whole life of a community apart from the very site of action. 
(Connerton, 1989) This grounds the potential of its political applications. 
Durkheim offers the most influential early social scientific view of ritual, 
relating it to religious practices of the sacred and the profane. To him, rituals are 
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what set down how a man should behave in the presence of sacred objects. 
Malinowski approaches ritual from the point of view of its social functions, that it 
confirms social order and reestablishes solidarity within a group after a crisis; and 
as social action, ritual carries out the transformation of the physical and 
metaphysical world, and provides practical effects. (Malinowski, 1922; 1948) 
To posit ritual in a more specialized way, in the political context, Kertzer 
reclaims the political and social significance of ritual in several ways: ritual is not 
merely about supernatural and religions, it operates on political and social 
relations as well; a misconception about ritual being used only in less advanced or 
modern societies, is to be replaced by the fact that ritual is indispensable in 
modern political systems and complex social matrix and interactions; thirdly, 
being political activity a political ritual is an integral part of the system instead of 
being just periphery, less real and formal one; lastly, political ritual is addressed to 
the mass but not only the elites and the educated. 
In his study of political ritual in the early Republic of China, Peter Zarrow 
(2001) suggests that the then newly established government sought a new 
language of power by political ritual, as 'power must always be expressed in some 
way'. (Zarrow, 2001:152)Like the theoretical framework of seeing nationalism as 
a mode of representation, political ritual too is analyzed by its 
‘representative-ness‘ of power and social construction of symbolic and ritual 
representations. It is the efficacious representations of the national community, as 
well objectifies social relations. In Durkheim's account, rituals are to be 
interpreted as symbolic representations of particular concepts of what a society is 
and of how it functions. (Connerton, 1989) In the end, all power is inevitably 
ritualized in a conscious effort to carry it on, adapt, and on rare occasions, create 
pageantry (Zarrow, 2001) - the last point being well fitted in the flag-raising of 
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Hong Kong being commodified into a tourist gaze before retro acting its political 
origin. 
Before turning to the local example, we should return to Kertzer and Zarrow 
who demonstrates those in control/competition of ritual production. 
Kertzer suggests that to understand the power of political ritual, one must 
examine the power of symbol, the struggle for power among those in control of 
this symbolic production. Materially, the force in control of the ritual comes from 
the state/ government; the non-material force is nothing but nationalism. In the 
case of flag-raising in Hong Kong, political economy of tourism may well be 
another non-material force of production to the ritual. 
It is well enough for Zarrow to point out that there is always struggle and 
negotiation going on with the meanings of political ritual, "for different groups 
and individuals ascribe different meanings to ritual while struggling to adapt and 
appropriate them." (Zarrow, 2001:158) Dittmer and Kim (1993) painstakingly 
point out there are always "winners and losers of the national symbol system". 
Somehow, the winners of the system are always the institutionalized; the losers 
are the localized and the subverted. 
Kertzer reaches the same point as he quotes Durkheim by saying that, 'what 
is important in ritual is our common participation and emotional involvement, not 
the specific rationalizations by which we account for the rites.' (Kertzer, 1988:67) 
The former is the public act of acceptance, which can well be contrasting to the 
beliefs privately held for the rituals. This explains how political ritual can create 
'solidarity without consensus’，a significant role of ritual to serve politics by 
producing bonds without requiring uniformity of belief. 
In sum, political ritual is the symbolic collective text, a master narrative that 
reminds of a community of its identity as represented and told in such inscription. 
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2.2.2 Ritual, Media, Spectacle 
If to regard ritual as a mode of representation, mediatized ritual then becomes the 
very (re-)presentation within representation. The two of them are the dialectics of 
'liveness' and 'mediatization', as maintained by Philip Auslander (1999). He 
formulates the notion of ‘liveness’ in his study of the same name. Live events now 
become problematic in face of media technology. It is only when media culture 
becomes pervasive that the conception of an event being held ‘live’ becomes 
necessary. As he points out, sports events and concerts that feature huge video 
screens are hardly live at all. At one point, he sees live performance as a means of 
commenting on media culture from the outside. (Auslander, 1999) Yet, being a 
performance studies scholar, Auslander lacks the sensitivity to track down the 
politics of liveness, i.e. in what circumstances and by whom a single event be 
turned into live transmission. This slippage is supplemented by the established 
study on media events by Dayan and Katz (1992). 
Media scholars are fascinated in studying the interaction between ritual, 
performance and media, which provides diverse forms of representations. 
Comparison between the unrealities of ritual and media also helps to think about 
the ways in which we frame realities and how variable framings alter our roles, 
self-images and identities. 
According to Dayan and Katz, political ritual, in particular, flag-raising, 
could be categorized as media events, in which it belongs to either 'coronations' 
(the rite of passage of the great, such as the Hong Kong 1997 handover ceremony〕） 
3 The large-scale ceremony starting June 30，1997 until the midnight of July 1, 1997 to mark the 
official retreat of the British rule over Hong Kong, the sovereignty transfer to China, and the 
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or 'contests' (such as the Olympic games). What gives them a generic character is 
that they are usually transmitted simultaneously or extensively by different TV 
channels. They are generally reported uncritically by broadcasters. And they reach 
and interrupt mass audience by entailing a special significance with the live 
broadcast. 'Media events are thus monopoly communications, uncritically 
reproduced, that function as collective rites of communion.' (Curran & Liebes, 
1998:4) 
Indeed, media event is another kind of ritual in itself. Katz and Dayan treat it 
as collective social rites, integrating a diverse set of expectations into a narrative 
genre (the master narrative). To take the 1997 handover ceremony of Hong Kong 
as an example, it is "a series of staged spectacles", the "planned symbolic 
performances" that media presents as narratives. (Knight & Nakano, 1999:3) In 
consequence, TV viewing of the events is also a ritual of citizenship, in which ‘a 
cultural situation' is created. (Alexander & Jacobs，1998) Solidarity continually 
forms and reforms civil society, in which media events serve as one of the 
communicative spaces for the 'imaginative construction and reconstruction of 
more diffuse, but equally important, collective identities and solidarities.' 
(ibid.:23) 
The mediatized ceremony and flag-raising ritual in June 30, 1997 are 
considered significantly as one of the exemplary of media events, and of how the 
event is turned into a global spectacle (Lee et al.，2000). More importantly, for this 
study, is to see how the media event is treated as the "spectacular national 
establishment of the Hong Kong Special Adminstrative Region of the People's Republic of China. 
It attracted global attention and was regarded as a media battle of the century (Knight & Nakano, 
1999)，"a momentous day for China" (in a speech of the Hong Kong Chief Executive Tung 
Chee-hwa delivered on the spot); The Prince of Wales of British said it was the important and 
special ceremony to mark a moment of both change and continuity in Hong Kong's history" 
(Knight & Nakano，1999:156) 
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festivities" (Pan et al., 2001, my emphasis), which center the theme of nationalism 
onto China's newly decolonized subordinate as well as the global audience. 
In his study on political ritual on television, James Carey (1998) provides 
further explication on the relations between mediatized ritual, solidarity and 
nationalism. He maintains that media events are episodes in the history of nation 
state, and in the age of television, the relations between states, nations and peoples. 
Elaborating Anderson, he believes it is the 'most important form which create the 
imaginary community of the nation.' (Carey, 1988:43) Hence, he explains the 
symbolic properties of a nation as: living not only in historical time but also in 
media time; within not only history but also geography - the media space; the 
symbolic space of identities. How media time and space juxtaposes with the 
historical and physical time and space in which the symbolic production and 
consumption of flag-raising takes place attracts some points of investigation. 
A final remarks about ritual and media is what Kertzer describes as the 
'symbolcide of media' (Kertzer, 1988), that is, the erasure of colonial symbols and 
rituals especially in the media space. This kind of "symbol cleansing" serves the 
purpose of nation building by relocating Hong Kong with a more suitable past. In 
this way, Remembrance Day and Queen's birthday were abolished in the social 
calendar, and disappeared from the media spectacle. The flag of 
Taiwan/Kuomintang becomes the "loser" in the national symbol system which no 
longer resonant to the system and is curbed from representation in the cultural 
frame of the media and the everyday life. 
Ritual is a duty; spectacle is a choice. MacAloon (1984) talks about the 
'degenerating' of ritual into spectacle, just like 'Easter into the Easter Parade'. In 
case of flag-raising as political ritual, the so-called degeneration has two senses of 
meanings. One is the transformation into a media spectacle as in the broadcast of 
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media events; another one is the exoticized ritual as consumed by tourists. 
MacAloon alerts us by saying, exotic rituals maybe perceived as spectacles by 
outsiders who happen upon them 一 explorers, tourists, or anthropologists. These 
outsiders commit a 'genre error' since their roles as observers are not built into the 
structure of the performance itself. Outsiders' typifications of ritual events as 
spectacles are at best metaphorical, or rhetorical, (MacAloon, 1984) Yet, by 
downplaying the 'outsider typifications' in understanding the structure of ritual is 
insufficient in outlying how such 'typifications' might affect and interrelate with 
the genuine 'genre' of a ritual. In subsequent chapters, flag-raising would be 
operationalized into various dimension/ 'genre', one of which includes the tourist 
gaze, to better manifest the multi-'structure [s] of the performance'. 
2.2.3 Symbolic Communication and National Identity 
Why is it important to relate symbolic communication to nation building? We 
reckon that there is a reason for people to identify with their country (a universal 
cognitive need), and a content with which they identify (a narration of an 
imagined community). These two aspects in fact make up the ongoing process of 
national identification, in other words, a national identity for the people to build 
up relationship between oneself and the nation. In that very process is where 
symbolic communication plays its part of aligning individual to a collective unit. 
Since it is a process, national identity is never a fixed set of boundaries or a 
property of a state. Its elaboration is like what Anderson and Hobsbawn have 
suggested, invented, appropriated, reinterpreted and reproduced; and it is as well 
multiple and hybridized. (Ma & Fung，1999) Multiple identities are for example 
demonstrated among Chinese in Southeast Asia, who possess "not situational 
identities, or alternative identities which one can switch around or switch on and 
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off, [but] the simultaneous presence of many kinds of identities, e.g., ethnic, 
national (local), cultural and class identities." (Wang, 1988: 17) White and Cheng 
(1993) further suggest that identities are situational for individuals can sometimes 
choose to stress one or another, political for the choices are purposeful; multiple 
for the co-existences of different identities. This recalls how symbolic 
interactionists believe that an identity is a repertoire of roles. (Goffman, 1959) 
There are different expectations to be fulfilled by someone bearing a national 
identity in different circumstances, with multiple manifestions of a (national) 
identity, all deemed necessary to maintain the state as a collective unit. 
Dittmer and Kim (1993) outline two dimensions of national identity. One is 
the act of identification, ranges from weak to strong on a scale of legitimacy; 
another one is the substantive content with which people identify, namely the state 
itself. What the state is, is always relational; a state identifies itself by 
self-alignment in the international level, in relation to other states. But in the 
newly decolonized Hong Kong, a state-centre (China) is always identified in 
relation to the local-periphery (Hong Kong), in which a self/ other demarcation is 
applied to set out identity boundary. 
A state also defines itself by the ensemble of symbols "collected to represent 
the principles on which the group was founded and on the basis of which its 
members have contracted to live together." (ibid.: 17) The ensemble is what we 
have mentioned before, the national symbol system. Oral tradition of myths and 
rituals, flags, national ceremonies of commemoration, and so forth, are the 
common basis on which national identity is fostered. It is because they often 
convey a core value of the system that stipulates a national power for the public 
common good. This naturally tends to inspire identification, and sometimes even 
worship. They are always standardized and unifying, so that individuals can 
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jointly identify with the nature and meaning of the symbol system. Of course, in 
the ongoing process of identification and imagination, this national essence is by 
no means fixed in the past, but subject to recurrent reinterpretation and accretion 
in the services of the present. By the same token, in the multiple process of 
identification, the national essence can be subject to resistance and negotiation. 
People project their aspirations onto the symbols, and may also project dismay 
and destructions to them. 
2.3 Operational Treatment of Identity 
Despite the multifaceted nature of identity, the following study on the national 
identity of postcolonial Hong Kong requires an operational treatment of identity 
that can highlight the power play of the identity politics. White and Cheng (1993) 
suggest a treatment of three basic layers that provide some clues: 
Firstly, an identity has the basic layers of historical experience that have 
created "primordial" groups. Somehow, Anderson's formulation of national 
identification is criticized by mostly postcolonial scholars as insensitive to these 
pre-existed ethnic traits. (Chatterjee, 1993; Smith, 1993) What Wang (1988) has 
suggested about multiple identities, nevertheless, recalls the ethnic identities of 
the Chinese in Southeast Asia, which are similarly applicable to the case of Hong 
Kong. 
Secondly, the more recent situational layers of historical experience that have 
given these groups further preferences of identification. Again, it is shown that 
identities are always in the growth and unfixed. In the context of Hong Kong, the 
"situations" that make up this layer is the British colonization, the 1997 
decolonization, and her entry to an endo-colonial rule under China after 1997. The 
"preferences of identification" thus become hybridized and complex. 
- 2 3 -
Lastly, the way people are led actually to choose or alter their options, in 
instrumental attempts to meet or redefine their current needs. In the context of this 
study, the "instrumental attempt" is the commercialization and institutionalization 
of national identities via the adoption and adaptation of the national flag-raising 
ritual. 
Indeed, identity offers people choices. That makes it absolutely political. 
(Hung, 1997) The making of choices interacts with their changing needs and other 
identities at play in the vicinities, as well as the political power play in control of 
the social development. 
2.4 Conclusion 
As indicated by the selected literature review, nationalism, symbolic 
communication and postcoloniality thread the theoretical framework of the 
research. Nationalism is to be approached in 'a mode of representation', in which 
it becomes the symbolic space of nation (space of meanings, values and identities). 
Nationalism in the postcolonial context becomes problematic as it could never 
escape from the old discursive formation of the West/colonizers. To revive 
nationalism against colonizers is thus a challenging effort. Bhabha's 
postcoloniality is thus deployed to describe circumstances more accurately, in 
which the nature of the decolonized states being transitory territories is put into 
concern. 
In understanding the relationship between nation building and ritual, 
neo-Durkeheimian thoughts are organized to connect symbolism and society, and 
that social structure is created as much as sustained in symbolic actions. Meaning 
is a matter of interaction between the symbol, the group and individuals within the 
group. Hermeneutic approach is used to analyse cultural artefact and its meanings. 
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Symbolic communication grounds the cultural field of creativity and production, 
as Geertz maintains, not only mirroring, but also mediating with the social. It is 
also a dramatistic model of social inquiry, which sheds lights on the symbolic 
functions of social actions. Rituals are to be studied in the methodology of the 
sociology of symbol, concerned with the relationship between ritual and nation 
building. The very essence of the relationship is how an individual identifies with 
a collective unit of a nation via the participation of the symbolic production and 
reproduction of ritual in the core of a national symbol system. 
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Chapter Three Operationalization 
3.1 Research Questions 
Based on the theoretical framework developed in the previous chapter, 
nationalism, postcoloniality and symbolic communication become the thread of 
this research. Against the background of Hong Kong's decolonialization in 1997 
and her state of postcoloniality, this research focuses on the national flag-raising 
ritual as the analytical tool to find out the relationship between symbolic 
communication and nation building in Hong Kong, in which the problematic of 
national identity in a postcolonial world is also expected in discussions. 
This research does not seek a generalized or representative picture of what 
Hong Kong identity is after 1997. Its interest is to look at the process of 
nationalization via a symbolic ritualistic act. By doing so, a picture of the Hong 
Kong identity performance can be described. Here, the research locates the 
national flag-raising ritual as the efficacious machinery of Hong Kong's nation 
building project. Hence, in the first place, the research probes into the form and 
content of the ritual since its introduction to the decolonized Hong Kong, tracks 
down and describes the possible transformations that the ritual has been 
experiencing since 1997. What stages has the national flag-raising ritual been 
going through on the road to its settlement in Hong Kong? 
Secondly, as reflected by the development of the ritual, what will be the 
identity performances of the people who participate in the act? What stages do 
Hong Kong people go through in their national identity formation via national 
flag-raising ritual? 
Henceforth, thirdly, in what ways do identity performances and the ritualistic 
act mutually correspond? In what ways do negotiations undergo between national 
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ritual and identity formation? 
In answering these questions, does the case of Hong Kong national 
flag-raising add to our understanding of nationalism and postcoloniality? 
3.2 Double Meaning of STAGING 
As the analytical tool, flag-raising ritual is going to be conceptualized as a 
symbolic and material production. Two delineations about the ritual are initially 
taken. 
One is to generalize the ritual in the local setting and trace its transformation 
since 1997. Another is to specify different situations in which the ritual is executed 
in different levels of the society. The two delineations are further analyzed in 
consideration of the double meaning of "staging": 
The former is the stages as phrases, that is, the development of the national 
ritual in Hong Kong; in other words, the stages of transformation that the ritual 
has been going through. Three stages are delineated, which capture and describe 
the development, whereas a guiding force of a political mission to affirm a 
legitimate national identity mutually negotiates with the development in a subtle 
way. Initial description goes like: 
Ambivalence ^ Mimicry ^ Relocation 
^AJfirmation, the political mission 
The latter is the stages as platforms, that is, the situations in which the 
national ritual and the corresponding identities are performed, where identification 
to the local and the nation is situated. The stages include tourist spectacle, 
recurrent calendrical event, media event and voluntary civic programs 
The study proposes that, both kinds of staging are multiple rather than linear 
and single. The former argues that it is the very feature of Hong Kong's 
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postcoloniality that nationalization via the ritual encounters the localization of the 
ritual. The temporal delineation also provides a contextualization of Hong Kong's 
postcolonial environment and the Sino-Hong Kong relationships. Under such 
contextualization, the latter detects the irregular contents of identification and 
identity performance that nationalization encounters in the multi-site of the 
ritualistic act. 
3.3 Research Methods 
This research adopts a qualitative approach to capture the exciting process of 
identity formation and performance, and to describe abstract conceptions such as 
national affection and allegiance. Instead of using statistical procedures or other 
means of quantification to reach causal determination of relationships, the 
research seeks to achieve reflection and understanding of phenomenon. 
Ethnographic studies are used in the research. As a process of "thick 
description" (Geertz, 1973) of culture or way of life, ethnography best suits a 
research of cultural production, namely, a study on how the ritual is produced, 
mediated and received by individuals in the society under the specific cultural 
frame. However, audience research is not included in this study due to a theoretic 
concern, also a significant research interest of the project, that is, the 
institutionalization of the ritual and the contextualization of the growth of national 
force in the society, come before individual reception as the more important 
signpost of the Sino-Hong Kong identification problematics. Should it allow a 
longitudinal research over a longer period of time, in which a cluster of 
individuals could be studied in terms of their reception, audience analysis could 
be supplementary to the project. 
Still, a number of field work is conducted starting 2002 which includes: 
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Field work at the morning rituals of the Golden Bauhinia Square' on July 1 
and October 1 of the year 2002 and 2003; and the month of April in 2003 and 
2004. 
Field work at the National Flag exhibition in the Hong Kong City Hall which 
was held in October 2003. The exhibition was organized by the Education and 
Manpower Bureau. 
Besides ethnography, historiographical approach is also adopted for the sake 
of actualizing a contextual study based on the intriguing historical moments that 
Hong Kong has been experiencing. 
Historiography is the method of research by gathering and analyzing 
historical evidence. In this study, running records of Hong Kong decolonization, 
Sino-Hong Kong relations, and the flag-raising ritual are studied. Data collection 
is retroacted to as early as 1997, and continues until 2004. The running records are 
commentaries, documentaries, government documents and newspapers. The 
archival research provides sources of information with validity and reliability to 
reach conclusions, and supports the study with appropriateness to the context of 
the time period in concern. 
Case study is also conducted to rescue individual data among the 
contextualized details. One of the cases is the flag-raising workshop held at 
Fukien Secondary School, Siu Sai Wan, in April 2003; the one-day workshop is 
one of the series organized by the Association of the Hong Kong Flag Guard. 
Another is a school celebration of the National Day. CUHK FAA Chan Chun Ha 
Secondary School in Ma On Shan had the celebration on September 30, 2003，and 
‘ T h e Square was especially built to prepare for the sovereignty transfer of Hong Kong. Ever since 
1997, the annual celebration of the "Establishment Day" of the Special Adminstrative Region of 
Hong Kong on July 1 is held in the Square. Daily ritual of flag-raising is also conducted in the 
Square by the Hong Kong Police Force. 
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rehearsals in the weekends before the event. 
To supplement the fieldwork and case studies, further data are collected via 
interviews with the District Offices of the Home Affairs Bureau officials, 
Education and Manpower Bureau, Association of the Hong Kong Flag Guard, 
school teachers and students. 
Textual analysis is also conducted to study a number of media text about 
flag-raising ritual. Interpretations are made on the governmental Announcement 
of Public Information (API) on flag-raising ritual, first on air in 2002. Also, a 
public affairs program of Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK), Headliner^, is 
chosen to study the mediatization of ritual. Samples are drawn from all episodes 
in the first week of July from 1997 to 2003，which cover the ritual of the handover 
anniversary. 
Textual analysis and case study on a theatre group, Shu Ning Presentation 
Unit is also conduced to examine the artistic representation of the ritual. Samples 
were drawn from their performances from 1997 to 2003 in which flag-raising 
ritual was represented. 
With the data collected by the above means, analysis and reflections are 
made. The temporal "staging" of the ritual is what we now turn. 
2 Headliner was first broadcasted in April 4，1989. It is a seasonal weekly news program 
acclaimed for its political satire. The program summarizes important local and international news 
in the corresponding week but in a comical, humorous and light-hearted way 
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Chapter Four Temporal Staging of Flag-raising Ritual 
This chapter outlines the development of national flag-raising ritual in Hong Kong 
after 1997. The term "development" has implied a gradual transition of the ritual 
instead of an immediate settlement since it was officially introduced upon the 
• ... 
handover ceremony. The following analysis attempts to elucidate this]''gradual 
transition of the ritual's content, its symbolic political application, and people's 
expectation of its symbolic political task; after all, it is to map out how the "new 
tradition" (Hobsbawn, 1983) comes into presence in local culture, and how it 
evolves during the course: is the transition a radical conversion to derive 
"newness" from convention? Is the transition a modification of convention 
negotiating with local needs to achieve hegemonic control? Or, is the transition a 
revision of the absolute political objective of nation building? As to be shown 
below, the transition, as time advances, can be delineated into different "stages" 
along the temporal order, with features of their own, revealing what the ritual has 
gone through to have a shape of its own as we see today. By doing so, the 
machinery of national building is thus examined; the negotiation of a Hong Kong 
identity is thus discerned. 
4.1 Master Narrative of Flag-raising against the post-colonial context 
The master narrative of the flag-raising ritual was official established for the Hong 
Kong people in the 1997 handover ceremony. It exemplifies a guise of power, 
nationhood and national pride, which is far from familiar for the newly 
decolonized Hong Kong, since it has long been regarded as a "functional", 
"economic" and "apolitical" colonial state. But with the Chinese national flag 
hoisted precisely at the midnight of July 1, 1997，Hong Kong politically returns to 
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China. The ritual becomes a symbolic proclamation of a nation's power and rule 
over its subordinate city. It becomes the major political totem and the first and 
foremost public ritual in the local history (Ma, 1996). 
The speech made by the President of the PRC during the ceremony, and the 
media discourse around the ritual thereafter, have all endorsed the ritual with such 
specific, and highly symbolic, political significance.^ 
In this way, the master narrative of the ritual was created. It is a stable 
narrative with unquestionable political significance; it recognizes the power of the 
nation and the central government, since the national flag and the national anthem 
are solemnly put forth; it is a reminder of Hong Kong's autonomy as a capitalist 
state under the "one-country-two-system", since the SAR flag of Hong Kong is 
also hoisted during the ritual; it is the union of China, it instigates affection, 
respect and commitment to the nation, since people are regulated to have solemn 
and sincere attendance/participation to the ritual; most of all, with such solemn 
participation to the ritual, people are then symbolically allowed a membership of 
the nation, collectively recognized as people under the same roof; sense of 
solidarity and belonging to the nation is conveyed; in other words, a patriotic 
expression of a national identity. 
If we draw reference from how flag-raising ritual is considered in the 
mainland one would not deny the strength of this master narrative embedded in 
the act of raising a national flag: 
1 The speech opens, "National flag of the PRC and the SAR flag have already been hoisted in 
Hong Kong solemnly. Now, people all over the world have cast their gaze to Hong Kong..." 
{MingPao, July 1，1997); captions of the photo essay of the flag-raising ritual goes "A handover 
ceremony of some twenty minutes can never tell comprehensively the deeper meanings of Hong 
Kong's end of colonial rule and her return to China. The falling of the Union Jack, the rising of the 
Chinese national flag: nothing other than that can bear more substantial and symbolic meanings." 
(ibid.) 
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Those who do not belong to the motherland do not belong to 
the mankind. Similarly, those who do not feel affection for the 
national flag do not feel the same to the motherland...Our 
nation is supreme, and so is the solemn and sacred national flag. 
It stands for free, independent, democratic and strong new 
China, for the honour and pride of the PRC, expresses the 
ancient but energetic nationalism, witnesses the socialist nation 
leaps forward to precede and posit itself among the world 
power...The flag-raising ritual in the Tiananmen Square has 
already become a unique spectacular in the capital 
Beijing...Those who come to see the ritual in this sacred land 
also see the epical changes and release stunning hopes...There 
is no other nation in this world to have so many flag-raisers 
marching at the same time, holding breathe in the same way, in 
the same ritual of salutation, with the same heartfelt refinement. 
(Hua Qi et al., 2002: foreward; my emphasis) 
The ritual is obviously considered a sacred act in China. It stands for national 
pride; and more importantly, as the latter part has suggested, it calls for a 
"togetherness" of people's execution and engagement of the ritual. In other words, 
the ritual requires standardization so as to create bonding of a national identity. 
Therefore, when bringing this national ritual to the newly returned Hong Kong, 
the same content is expected to put across, the same form is expected to act upon. 
The reason for China's appeal to nationalistic sentiment is considered a means to 
"narrow the social distance between itself and capitalistic Hong Kong...little by 
little sharpen a Chinese identity". (Lau，1994:301) 
But the question is, does the ritual in Hong Kong successfully convey this 
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master narrative? Is the ritual working out the same task of national bonding as 
that in the mainland? To understand this, one must first turn to the post-colonial 
context of Hong Kong after the handover. 
By postcoloniality of Hong Kong it suggests not the periodisation of Hong 
Kong after 1997，but the cultural reaction, situation and experience in the locality 
since her decolonisation. To put Hong Kong under the postcolonial context 
becomes an analytical tool to unmask the power politics happening upon Hong 
Kong's decolonization, since there rises her "processes of transformation", a 
reaction to colonialism which seek to replace and redefine the colonising power 
with structures and ideas corresponding the socio-cultural preferences of the 
present Hong Kong. (Birch et al.，2001) The creation and transformation of this 
postcolonial subjectivity is a problematic and hybrid one. (Bhabha, 1994; 
Radhakrishnan, 1996) 
The postcolonial hybridity of Hong Kong mediates between a "metropolitan 
version of hybridity" of cosmopolitanism, westernized modernization, plus her 
indigenous Chinese-ness (which is realized in her course of British colonization), 
and a "postcolonial version of hybridity" of searching for legitimate and authentic 
) 
cultural-political identity, of re-sinicization as nationalization. The former lingers 
as the colonial legacy and the very basis of continual international survival of 
Hong Kong, the latter is the up-and-coming force of nation building and urgent 
re-positioning, in which the metropolitan hybridity could not (and need not) be 
easily whitewashed. Radhakrishnan (1996) reminds us of how "joyful" the former 
hybridity brings about (for example, as demonstrated by the economic success of 
Hong Kong upon such metropolitan positioning in the past decades), and how 
2 "Re-sinicization refers to the recollection, reinvention and rediscovery of historical and cultural 
ties between Hong Kong and China." (Ma & Fung，1999:500) 
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"frustrating" the latter search can be, for he reckons the latter as a potential 
rebellious and laborious force of self-invention against colonial power. 
Although theoretically speaking hybridity functions as the "ultimate 
decentering of all identity regimes", Radhakrishnan (1996) critically suggests the 
hybridity is rather valorised on the basis of a stable identity, such as European 
hybridity. In the case of Hong Kong, however, the "stable identity" on which 
postcolonial hybridity depends is obviously a Chinese identity. And it is exactly 
this fact that renders Hong Kong's postcolonial hybridity an even more painful, 
unstable and rebellious force. For the colonial power that the postcolonial 
hybridity has to negotiate is not only the west, but also getting to include China. 
To explain this, one must look at how Birch et al describes Hong Kong as the 
"best example" to demonstrate the state of "endo-colonialism", that is, a form of 
colonialism directed rather internally from China to Hong Kong. "Theoretically 
the Chinese government was freeing Hong Kong and its people from the control 
of British colonialism", suggests Birch et al (2001:49), but it is spurred by 
nationalist rhetoric to preserve the status quo of Hong Kong, rendering a halt in 
democratic reforms. Decolonization is understood by both the British and the 
Chinese government as not liberation but maintenance of status quo; 
decolonization has to ensure a "frozen Hong Kong" (Lui, 2002) instead of a 
reformed Hong Kong; it is a compromise made by Hong Kong for the sake of 
self-protection, owing to a collective fear to the Communist Chinese regime, and 
owing to a national urge of utilising the capitalistic Hong Kong. Therefore to 
complete Hong Kong's decolonization means only to ensure a "decent and smooth 
handover of a Hong Kong which can benefit the development of China", that is, 
an economically thriving, socially stable and capitalistic Hong Kong without too 
much turbulence of democratic advancement. In this way, Hong Kong's 
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decolonization does not include any intention of further national or social building, 
(ibid.) 
At most, the need to maintain status quo comes hand in hand with the 
nationalistic aspiration to close social distance between China and Hong Kong. 
But the controversy over central intervention on the government proposal to 
implement Article 23 (2003) ^，the National People's Congress Standing 
Committee's twice interpretations on partial articles of the Basic Law (1999, 
2004)，the denunciation of universal suffrage in 2007/08 elections (2004/, and the 
rumour of the introduction of national unification law (2004)5，become more vivid 
examples of the claim that China becomes the new internal colonizer that suppress 
the local subordinate. The nationalistic aspiration to close social distance between 
China and Hong Kong that Lau has suggested on the above, are now regarded as 
tasks in forms of centralisation; while centralising can be the disguise of 
colonising in postcolonial states like Hong Kong. 
Hong Kong's decolonization is a continual suppression of liberation and 
autonomy. Her postcoloniality is hence a complex and ambivalent one, mediating 
between compromise and disobedience. More reasons to explain this is that, 
before 1997，Abbas (1993:4) has suggested that Hong Kong's postcoloniality is "a 
3 Legislation of "Article 23" in the Hong Kong Basic Law has triggered swelling concern across a 
broad spectrum of society. Its legislation, being proposed by the Hong Kong government which 
claimed it ostensibly to protect national security, is also regarded by the public as undermining 
freedom of expression, (www.article23.org.hk) The controversy has led to the break-out of a 
large-scale public rally in July 1，2003. Under pressure, Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa was 
forced to abort the legislation. 
4 China's top legislature, the NPC Standing Committee, has exercised its right to interpret the 
Basic Law. The two clauses interpreted, Clause 7 of Annex I and Clause 3 of Annex II’ relate to 
the selection of the Chief Executive of the HKSAR and the formation of the Legislative Council as 
well as procedures for voting on bills and motions after 2007. Democrats have claimed this act as 
the violation of Hong Kong's autonomy and the "one-country-two-system". Verdict was reached of 
the suspension of Hong Kong's right to universal suffrage of the Legislative Council, 
5 In July, 2004, rumours have been released from Beijing, saying the National People's Congress 
(NPC) planned to complete the legislation of "National Unification Law" to prevent Taiwan 
from being independent. In principles, the law also applies to other parts of China, including 
Hong Kong. Local democrats were sensitised in fear of the violation of freedom. 
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postcoloniality that precedes decolonization". The decolonized Hong Kong, 
despite being the political subordinate to China, is in fact more advanced in other 
aspects than her "new" quasi-colonizer. Li (1997) further describes it as a 
"temporal-spatial dislocation". Political subordination and cultural superiority has 
resulted in a rupture in Sino-Hong Kong relation, in which the locals has long 
been using cultural differentiation with the Chinese to create their own distinctive 
identities. (Ma, 2000; Lui, 2002; Ku, 2002) The fact that Hong Kong people 
identify themselves as Chinese in a rather abstract and detached sense, and 
discriminate against the particular cultural practices which are affiliated with the 
Communist mainland regime, renders nationalization of Hong Kong after 1997 a 
complicated project upon this ambivalent Sino-Hong Kong identity^. 
Against these contexts, the postcolonial hybridity of Hong Kong could 
possibly be divided into two versions, one postcolonial quest to legitimize an 
official identity via resinicization standing against the colonial legacy, another 
endo-colonial identity quest of democratized locality against the stable narrative 
of re-sinicization. The "erratic path" of identity formation of Hong Kong upon the 
sovereignty transfer?, continues to extend to become a chronic identity negotiation 
in her postcoloniality. However, to what extent is Hong Kong's postcolonial 
hybridity an intended disturbance to the colonial/ endo-colonial power? Is it a 
tactic of power deconstruction, as demonstrated by other decolonized states, or 
simply a strategic manipulation for the sake of her own survival because of the 
o 
unique cultural-political environment of Hong Kong? 
6 Ma & Fung (1999) describes it as the de-sinicization of Hong Kong people, who obtain their 
distinctive identity vis-众-vis mainland citizens during her colonization. 
7 Ma & Fung (1999) precisely points out this "erratic path", for "colonial rule subtly created a 
space in which the Hong Kong identity could exist (which was distanced from the Chinese at 
large), the sovereignty transfer of Hong Kong back to China has, however, attempted to eclipse it." 
8 Cultural theorist Homi Bhabha suggests that hybridity is a tactic powerful of questioning the 
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Before answering the questions, one should note that such negotiation has 
resulted in the creation of new spaces to nourish identity; for example, the public 
ritual of national flag-raising. It is now a nationalistic claim upon a decolonization 
without original intention of nation-building; it is also a creation of new 
nationalist identification among people who embrace and resist a national and 
local identity at the same time. To adopt the above contextualization of Hong 
Kong's decolonization and postcoloniality, flag-raising ritual is thus a merely 
symbolic space of "a decent and smooth transition", of a technical execution of 
the "through-train" ^ , of a frozen capitalistic status-quo in which 
one-country-two-system is symbolically sustained by hoisting the national flag 
and the SAR flag. The nationalist narrative of the ritual so strongly embedded in 
its mainland execution does not come to the foreground in its SAR execution. And 
it is for this reason that, in the subsequent years of the handover one sees how this 
nationalist master narrative is intervened or even re-created by a localized 
implementation of the ritual, and by the postcolonial identity negotiation within a 
nationalist space of identity installation. To study the development of the ritual 
thus becomes a probe into the power politics of the Sino-Hong Kong identity. 
After all, Hong Kong is now in her crossroad of postcolonial "narrative 
invention" (Radhakrishnan, 1996). There is a need to make a political choice 
between her metropolitan hybridity as sedimented by the violent history of 
colonialism, an indigenous genealogy of the Chinese mandate, and a local 
postcolonial subjectivity upon the liberation and re-creation of the above. The 
question is long beyond a matter of identity authenticity, but a question of with 
which narrative the postcolonial Hong Kong articulates the power play in the 
colonizer; to cultural theorist de Certeau, tactic is unstable with no fixed trajectory (Chu, 1998) 
9 Lui states that to regard July 1, 1997 as nothing but a changing of national flag, simply 
represents the mindset of "handover as through-train." (Lui 2002) 
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course of the narrative invention. 
4.2 Multiple Staging of Flag-raising ritual in China 
Even in China, national flag raising did not fully settled right after its first 
ritualistic performance in October 1949 where the People's Republic of China was 
formally established. The course of its transformation, however, had a stable 
thematics to thread through, that is, a highly regulated political cause. The 
changes of the form, content, and position of the ritual were carried out in service 
of the ritual's master narrative of national bonding and building. A brief summary 
of the ritual's development in the modem history of China supports the claim. 
After the flag-raising ritual in the national inauguration ceremony on October 
1949，the ritual has been conducted everyday in the Tiananmen Square. But at 
first, it was conducted not by disciplinary units, but only one staff of the Beijing 
Electrical Supply Bureau. It was because the 1949 ceremonial ritual was 
electrically motivated, as proposed by this Bureau; for twenty years thereafter, this 
government organisation took up the duty to raise national flag. Flag-raisers were 
amateurs; the ritual was a routine. There was no broadcast of national anthem and 
attracted no audience. 
Remarkable changes happened in the year 1976，the ritual of local execution 
was handed over to the Capital Guards of the national army. The change was 
considered historical. A team of uniformed soldiers replaced the amateurish local 
staffs. They were grouped as flag-holders, flag escorts, and flag-raisers. The end 
of the Cultural Revolution in the same year has brought new lights to the political 
environment and structure of China, a reform in this highly symbolic political 
ritual was a response to the new era of political relocation. 
In 1982, the duty of the ritual was shifted to the Beijing squad of the People's 
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Police Force, learning from the practice of their predecessor (the army), and the 
introduction of "flag-raising classes", and the setting up of a national flag guard of 
36 police officers, have intended to make the ritual "more powerful, solemn and 
spectacular" in demonstration of a nation's power along her modernization and 
open-door policy. 
The National Flag Ordinances was announced and enforced in October 1990, 
regulating the occasions of raising national flag, and standardising the details of 
the flag and flag poles used. It also standardised the form of the ritual, including 
the number of people in a flag-raising team, their uniforms and ways of marching. 
A calendrical schedule was also adopted, in which the ritual in special national 
occasions, and the ”【，and of every month, should receive enhanced 
content with live performance of the National Military Band. 
"The national flag-raising ritual in the Tiananmen Square evolves with the 
advancing time, keeping up with creativity and progress; it is the miniature of the 
prosperous development of the Republic, symbolic to the forward leaping of the 
spirit of the Chinese nationality.” (Hua Qi et al , 2002:74; my emphasis) Without 
doubt, the symbolic meaning of the ritual has been built around national building; 
it also represents the success of the country's modernization and growth. Although 
the Tiananmen ritual is said to be one of the largest-scale and most solemn ritual 
of this sort, it never officially advertises herself as a tourist attraction. At most, it 
is a political pilgrimage for mainland people and a cultural pilgrimage for people 
over the world coming to the capital to taste the richness of Chinese culture. The 
ritual's symbolic meaning and practical execution is highly regulated and stable. 
4.3 Multiple Staging of Flag-raising ritual in Hong Kong 
Unlike the scenario in the modern history of China, it is argued that the stages of 
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development that flag-raising ritual received in postcolonial Hong Kong are rather 
multiple: the ritual is not an instant settlement onto the local soil, it takes time to 
come into terms with the local cultural frame and the local subjectivity; it is 
neither a linear settlement like the one in China, in which the ritual's master 
narrative of nation building strongly threads through the changing ritualistic 
executions to deliver persistency in the nationalist pursuit. Instead, it is a manifold 
transition of different intentions and utilizations in different stages. Despite the 
master narrative is comparatively stable, and is not (and cannot be) disavowed, 
this guiding force to affirm a legitimate national identity simply lurks behind 
rather than comes forth onto the localized ritual. 
Though chronological in time, the stagings are extremely sensitive to the 
socio-political context of Hong Kong, responds actively to the Sino-Hong Kong 
transborder distance. Hence, it is very possible that the path be erratic with twists 
and turns, instead of a safe landing to a complete settlement. 
An initial delineation is drawn to demonstrate the picture, which goes like: 
Ambivalence ^ Mimicry ^ Relocation 
^ Affirmation, the political mission 
4.3.1 Stage One: Ambivalence (1997-2001) 
One feature of postcolonial transformation is the way in which "colonial 
experiences continue to exert and influence over a nation's culture, institutions, 
identities and even their 'standing' relative to other 'postcolonial' nations, long 
after the colonial power has departed. (Birch et al.，2001) Colonial legacy is 
something to compete against, to be replaced, but at the same time, to reckon, 
without which revitalising force could not grow from within. 
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The positioning of the flag-raising ritual in the wake of the 1997 handover 
demonstrates the strand in colonial legacy and a new way of life. It became a daily 
public ritual in the Golden Bauhinia Square in Wan Chai, conducted by a small 
group from the Hong Kong Police Force. It was an official daily routine to 
conduct a symbolic start for the city day after day. It continued to proclaim a 
nation's rule over the territory. 
For four years the ritual has been conducted daily in a rather low profile 
manner. It was conducted disregard of the presence and absence of an audience. 
By contrast, the enhanced flag-raising ritual twice a year on July and October 
ist "required" an audience of government officials and political celebrities in the 
official commemoration of the sovereignty inauguration. It also symbolises to 
kick off a whole-day large-scale celebration of the handover and the National Day. 
It was only in these two occasions that the symbolic meaning of the ritual was put 
under the limelight. 
Newly brought into the locality of Hong Kong, the ritual suffers from 
extreme embrace and resistance. The former was marked by the eagerness of 
institutions to conduct the new ritual as celebration in occasions like the start of 
school term and the National the introduction of the ritual into schools as 
national education of anti-colonialism and anti-British thoughts was pushed 
forward by "pro-Beijing schools，，!、But at the same time, resentment to the ritual 
was the result of a strong local subjectivity that clings tightly onto Hong Kong's 
own way of life; "Hong Kong people are proud of their own achievement, and 
resist a Chinese style of living and rule. This kind of local subjectivity started to 
grow in shape since the 1980s...this explains why the originally apolitical citizens 
10 Wen Wei Bao, September 30，1997; "Pupils kick off year under new flag", Hong Kong Standard, 
September 2, 1997 
“MingPao, July 2, 1997 
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flnd extremely resentful to see some people suddenly become patriotic, practice 
the national anthem every morning, erroneously raising the national flag in the 
diisk...”i2 
It was not until October 2001, that the government decided to posit the daily 
ritual as a tourist attraction spot in a seemingly determined and high profile 
manner. It was announced that, in order to 'attract more tourists', the Hong Kong 
Tourism Board has requested the Hong Kong Police (responsible for the operation 
of the daily ritual) to "enhance the flag-raising c e r e m o n y " A trial run was held 
in every Friday of that October; the satisfactory result was assured as the 
enhanced ceremony was allowed to be 'made permanent' from January 2002 
onwards, in government's terms, 'for the promotion and uplift of the image of 
Hong Kong’ 
The re-positioning of the ritual as an asset of tourism was done with 
economical rather than political cause. Despite it experienced a significant twist of 
positioning at that point of time, it was still consistent with its concealed political 
nature during the early handover days. Before 2001，its political implication has 
been played down with a low-profile routine execution. Also, the same ritual did 
not receive wide and enforced execution in social spaces other than the Square, 
for example, in schools as a form of national education^^ The belief that raising a 
national flag is simply "symbolic" to a through-train sovereignty transfer of Hong 
Kong without any intention of national or social building is here well justified. 
A further proof is demonstrated by how government officials react to the 
ritual in a politically discreet manner. In 1998，Anson Chan, the then Chief 
12 Ng Chun-hung, Ming Pao, June 30，1997 
13 November 3, 2001; Police Report, Police Public Relations Bureau (PPRB); enhanced ceremony 
includes police band and riflemen escorted flag raisers. 
14 November 3，2001; Police Report, PPRB 
See next chapter 
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Secretary, expressed her personal feelings of how she found the flag-raising ritual 
on the first National Day of 1997 touching to her, and how the ritual made her 
finally embrace the return to China. But in the same speech, she immediately 
denied herself as becoming an apologist for China. The speech was delivered in 
Washington, and soon after she went back Hong Kong, she again publicly 
clarified that the speech about the ritual has no political intention or sincere 
confession. 
In sum, the supposedly political ritual received a discursive disturbance -- It 
symbolically differentiated the decolonized with the colonizer by hoisting a 
national flag everyday, but it is not anxious of setting up a power substitute; rather, 
it is anxious of the differentiation of this potential political establishment with the 
status quo. The ritual was then an ambiguous landmark of a capitalist, perpetually 
apolitical city "not different" from the past. After all, the central government has 
been intentionally keeping certain distance with the Hong Kong political structure 
and the Hong Kong society after the handover for fear of the accusation of 
intervention; this policy indeed has received satisfactory response from the locals. 
(Chan, 2003) The ambivalence of the national ritual simply corresponds to this 
adjustment of power. 
This production of uncertainty, the discursive splitting, around the ritual, is 
never a threatening or rebellious act. Rather, it is done along the lines of the 
utilization principle. (Lau and Kuan, 1990; Ku, 2002) The ritual became 
"communicable" to the locality not because of its retroactive political origin of 
colonial resistance, but its discursive twist to become the economic asset. 
For cultural theorists like Bhabha, ambivalence has a specific quality in 
postcolonial discourse, that intentionally highlights the differences between the 
colonizer and the colonized, that becomes the essentials of colonial mimicry, a 
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tactics against colonial homogenization, a disavowal of colonial power. (Bhabha, 
1994) Here, however, the ambivalence towards the ritual's political positioning 
has nothing to do with resistance against colonial/ endo-colonial power. The 
ambiguity in the local mindset in settling a newly created space of identity (a 
political ritual) did not come out of any strategic planning of power renunciation, 
but rather, of the urge to keep Hong Kong "unchanged" as a compromised means 
to establish local subjectivity in the decolonized era. Twisting the ritual to become 
a tourist spot is the exercise of such subjectivity (to be discussed in the next stage). 
So, when Bhabha continues to discuss ambivalence as the basis of colonial 
mimicry as resistance, the mimicry of the local flag-raising ritual is 
correspondingly apolitical and non-rebellious owing to ambivalence with no 
intention to fight. 
4.3.2 Stage Two: Mimicry (2001-2002) 
The effect of Bhabha's mimicry comes from how it "repeats rather than 
re-presents...the menace of mimicry is its double vision which in disclosing the 
ambivalence of colonial discourse also disrupts its authority..(Bhabha, 1994:88) 
Theoretically speaking, then, a "real and effective" ambivalence and mimicry that 
the postcolonial Hong Kong can carry out is in fact a public ritual of raising the 
British national flag as a tourist spectacle. For it plays the difference of a colonial 
and postcolonial Hong Kong, for it highlights the uncertainty of status quo in 
confrontation of the one-country-two-system, for it establishes local subjectivity 
in manipulating a symbolic power which used to be the manipulator, for it repeats 
as well as denounces colonial rule. Some intellectuals have indeed raised this idea 
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when criticizing the government decision of turning the ritual into a tourist spot'^. 
In their views, it is rather more "meaningful" for the Tourism Board to raise the 
Union Jack, as there is no point to watch the ritual in the Golden Bauhinia Square 
when there is a more legitimate and powerful ritual in the Tiananmen Square, 
Beijing, especially for the tourists from the mainland. 
This fanatical suggestion is indeed what Bhabha describes "an appropriation 
by producing a partial vision of the colonizer's presence, a gaze of otherness" - a 
real effect of mimicry. 
Back to reality, however, a different quality of mimicry could be found in the 
government decision to turn the ritual into a tourist spectacle. With the hope to 
attract tourists, the flag-raising ritual was enhanced into an entertainment-like 
spectacle that appealed to mainly mainland tourists. In subsequent years, media 
discourse of flag-raising has been built around its being a tourist spot and how by 
taking part in the ritual makes the mainland tourists feel proud of the country^^. 
Apparently, the re-positioning was established upon the fact that the 
Tiananmen ritual being also a renowned spot of tourists'/ mainlanders' pilgrimage. 
Now that Hong Kong advertised her own flag-raising as such was an attempt to 
achieve the same attractiveness of that of Beijing, which has attracted over one 
billion visitors over the past ten years. Hong Kong wanted to "follow suit". 
But the act is more than just "to go after" the State; rather, local subjectivity 
is strong in this move. Firstly, the move is consistent with the "utilitarianistic 
familism" that made up local subjectivity of Hong Kong since the 1980s; with a 
kind of "situational morality", Hong Kong people are said to tend to put moral 
concern under utilitarian calculations. (Lau, 1981; Lau & Kuan, 1990; Ku, 2002; 
16 Talk show Kwongmingdan, Commercial Radio Hong Kong, September 5，2003 
17 See next chapter 
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Chan, 2003). In this case, national affection and political affiliation conveyed in 
the ritual is regarded as means of economic survival because of its unique appeal 
to tourists particularly mainlanders. Movie director Fruit Chan has made similar 
comment on the patriotism of Hong Kong: “Hong Kong people suddenly became 
1 Q 
patriotic after 1997 simply because of their own interests." 
Secondly, had Hong Kong been aware of the Central-Local demarcation 
within a nation, she would not have advertised her own ritual without knowing the 
difference of the degree of appeal. But if one traces the development of Hong 
Kong's tourism discourse in the course of how local subjectivity is established, 
one would not surprise to see the move as a continual effort operates/ imitates the 
conception of "China" in the local's advantage. 
4.3.2a Tourism Discourse and Local Subjectivity 
Tourism has long been essential to the Hong Kong economy. Together with 
financial services, logistics and producer services, tourism is named the 'core 
industry', one of the few sectors that have registered growth during the present 
economic downturn. The Government Policy Address 2003 reiterates the essential 
connection to China in order to sustain and enhance the growth: "The World 
Tourism Organisation has forecast that China will lead the world in tourism by 
2020，and Hong Kong will take fifth place, partly because of our Mainland 
connections" (my emphasis) By advertising Hong Kong with an image of 
'East-meet-West' Creole, it attracts large amount of revenue of foreign exchange. 
Locality of Hong Kong is marked by both the tourism discourse and her 
intersecting economic miracle. Hu even argues that Hong Kong is where tourism 
18 New Weekly, vol. 168，February 2003，pp. 40 
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is used to achieve localization. (Hu, 2002) 
According to Hu, Hong Kong Tourist Association (HKTA) in the Sixties 
advertised New Territories as the countryside of Chinese history display. Tourists' 
brochures highlighted the fact that, in Hong Kong there was ‘no need to leam 
Chinese in order to appreciate Chinese culture'. Entering the Eighties, the 
narratives have changed into a 'Chinese culture with Hong Kong local favour'. 
Strategically, the tourism discourse has been constructed along the line of 
localizing Chinese-ness midst Hong Kong modernization: from the exotic 'Suzy 
Wong-style' to the westernized and modernized Chinese in highlighted local 
developments and histories; in the course, Hong Kong has long been 'operating 
China' to inscribe her own localities, in the hope to enrich and confirm the content 
of her subjectivity. With the 1997 sovereignty return, the Chinese-ness 
commercialized by the tourism industry has become even more legitimate and 
politically correct. Adding to this is how the industry flourishes owing to the 
increasing transborder mobility after 1997. 
4.3.2b Tourism Discourse and Transborder Mobility 
With the 1997 sovereignty return, transborder activities have brought in new light 
for the economy of Hong Kong. Mainland tourists have been supporting Hong 
Kong tourism and revenue generation in a substantial manner. The income they 
bring forth and the number of visiting mainland tourists keep climbing up since 
1997. A released document from the Security Bureau shows that, mainland 
tourists' spending in Hong Kong increased from $1.37 billion Hong Kong dollars 
in 1995 to $1.6 billion in 1997. They rank the biggest spenders among tourists of 
Hong Kong ever since. The 1999 statistics shows that average spending of one 
mainland tourist in Hong Kong is $4370, and $5169 for the year 2002. 
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As for the headcounts, 2.3 million mainland tourists visited Hong Kong in 
1997; 4.5 million was recorded in 2001, almost a two-third of the total number of 
visiting tourists from all over the world. The record got nearly 7 million in the 
following year and is predicted to have another million headcounts of growth in 
2003.19 The statistics shows that mainland tourists become the major component 
of local tourism activities. In particular, Golden Bauhinia Square and flag-raising 
are advertised in sight-seeing routes catering this grouping of visitors, such as in 
mainland touring websites and brochures. Tourist services 'normally involves a 
particular social grouping...to a significant extent different kinds of holiday 
experience are devised with these different social groups in mind.' (Urry, 1990: 25) 
The particular social experience designed for this social group of 'mainlanders' 
normally starts with watching flag-raising in early mornings.^^The ritual seems to 
be so tailor-made for mainlanders apparently because of its political significance 
that only this social group of tourist can embrace. 
A completely different picture reveals that transborder mobility between 
mainland and Hong Kong has long been highly political. Despite Hong Kong's 
dependency on mainland tourists in recent years，the road to immigration control 
relaxation is not an easy one. More importantly, it is the interplay between the 
political, the economical and the social. Urry has rightly stated that, mobility is 
important in 'altering how people appear to experience the modern world, 
changing bother their forms of subjectivity and sociability and their aesthetic 
appreciation of nature, landscapes, townscapes and other societies.' (Lash & Uiry， 
1994: 256; my emphasis) As one could see, the transborder mobility between 
19 The prediction was made before the outbreak of SARS. 
2° One the same field study mentioned above, the ritual was occupied by some 400 mainland 
tourists in one occasion; in another, though fewer in headcounts, coaches carrying mainland 
tourists arrived at the scene nearly every five minutes from 7.50am to 8:15am. 
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Hong Kong and China, manifested by the tourism discourse, has contributed to a 
changing power balance in the Sino-Hong Kong cultural politics. 
When flag-raising ritual was first 'promoted' in 2001，it was when the quota 
system for the Hong Kong Group Tour Scheme was about to be abolished, 
indicating an even more convenient admission of mainland tourists to the territory. 
Before the abolition, Hong Kong government was keen on keeping the gate 
tightly inspected. Since 1995，the daily quota of mainland tourists was only 928， 
but was increased to 1200 in subsequent years. It was said that during the 1997 
handover, quota was tightened again, lest the strong surge of mainlanders to Hong 
Kong. It was when the number of mainland tourists, sharing 20% of the total 
tourists visiting Hong Kong, uncommonly received a plummet. After the handover, 
local tourism suffered from severe blow. Urged by the industry and legislators, 
300 more quotas were added daily in 1998 to 1500 heads per day, visa 
applications for mainlanders were also simplified. As shown above, number of 
mainland tourists climbed satisfactorily. The quota was further raised to 2000 in 
the year 2000，but it was still under a regulated scheme until two years later, when 
the quota scheme was totally shut down. Thereby, mainlanders coming to Hong 
Kong still needed to be organized in groups. From January 2003 onwards, 
however, residents in Guangdong Province are allowed to visit Hong Kong in 
their personal capacity, indicating a larger degree of travel freedom and mobility. 
Material and symbolic distance between China and Hong Kong is closing down as 
time advances; transborder activities are considered more common and less 
threatening. 
By being a threat, it means that from government intervention to gradual 
relaxation, the effort to encourage mainland visitors is always a negotiation 
between economic demands, political necessity and social stability. For more 
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mainland visitors implies a significant increase of goyernment revenue, a closer 
tie and mutual acceptance with the motherland, yet, a greater risk of illegal influx 
of mainlanders. In an interview in 1998，the then Director of Immigration 
Department Li Siu-kwong has admitted that the increase of tourist quotas might 
encourage more cases of stay in arrears (daily quotas usually allows a period of 
stay from 3 to 15 days). In the following year, Exco member Leung Chun-ying 
has reiterated that, relaxation on corresponding restrictions would only be 
considered under the principle of not affecting the 'stability of Hong Kong 
border，2i. September 1998, there were 3268 overstay tourists, a 40% increase 
from the same month in 1997. They were the portions of illegal populations which 
were believed by many Hong Kong locals as parasites, the 'negative 
mainlanders'. 
Despite this, the discourse on transborder mobility undergoes rapid 
transformation which sheds light on the changing power balance of the 
centre/periphery. The tourism Legco representative Howard Young, in persuasion 
to visa-free admission for mainlanders, said that he expected visiting Hong Kong 
to become a habitual leisure activity for mainlanders, "just like Hong Kong people 
going up North to the mainland to spend, or residents in the Mid- and Northern 
England who go London to spend a weekend or short trips." Indeed, there is 
some kind of thinking that Hong Kong is now "the countryside" but not the SAR 
of China . The transborder distance is closing down, with Hong Kong being the 
legitimate periphery with the State as the centre. 
21 Sing Pao Daily, November 3, 1999 
22 Sing Tao Daily’ March 15，2003 
23 Playing of pun: in Chinese, "countryside" and SAR bear similar characters. It was from a radio 
program that I came across in Beijing in November 2003. 
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4.3.2c Tourism Discourse and Sino-Hong Kong identifications 
The increasing transborder mobility is changing the ways in which Hong Kong 
people and mainlanders are mutually identified. Being whether a tourist or not is 
fatal in deciding one's identity as the "positive and negative mainlanders" in Hong 
Kong. As Urry rightly states, tourists are with clear intention to return "home" 
within a relatively short period of time. (Urry, 1990). Hu also argued that 
mainlanders would not be welcome and respected by local population unless they 
"return home" after the vacation. (Hu, 2002) Whether they terminate their 
transborder activities demarcates "mainland tourists" with "mainlanders". 
Nevertheless, it is getting more important that, to qualify as mainland tourists 
one would spend before return. Needless to say, being a tourist has classified 
oneself into a "leisure class", that is, the class that "demonstrates esteem through 
leisure". (Urry 1990; my emphasis) Recent media discourse on mainland tourists 
has been putting focus on their increasing purchase power. Economic profits 
encompass the construction of mainlander's identity in Hong Kong. On the one 
hand, mainland tourists are embraced with economic significance (usually in 
disguise of, or come in hand with, political significance^'^); on the other hand, the 
"negative mainlanders", the "visitors" other than tourists, are even more 
marginalized in due course. "Positive mainlanders" might always remain in mere 
cultural imagination, if not marketing proposals. 
In similar manner, the "permanent population" in Hong Kong is also 
identified. Hong Kong welcomes and uses mainland tourists visiting the territory 
to re-represent herself: by arrangement of their visit to the handover memorabilia 
24八 columnist wrote in 2000 that, 'many brothers in mainland have got richer than before, Hong 
Kong people should welcome them to come visit and spend.' He continued by saying that, 
discriminating the brothers by the term 'Ah Cha-an’ was erroneous. 'There exists family affiliation 
between us that is more precious than merely counting money.' The article appears in a pro-China 
newspaper. Tai Kung Pao, April 21，2000 
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such as flag-raising and Golden Bauhinia Statue, the narratives of nationhood are 
deployed to illustrate the home-coming Hong Kong, which is now qualified as an 
"authentic" Chinese. It is with this positioning that Hong Kong survives both 
politically and economically in the postcolonial era. To raise a flag becomes both 
economically and politically "correct". 
4.3.2d Mimicry Fails 
Strategically bringing about political-economic advantages, the promoted ritual 
did not end up in satisfactory results. As mentioned, the past successful localized 
effort under colonial rule in promoting Hong Kong in tourism has convinced the 
postcolonial state, that she could still "operate China", the Other, in an active 
effort of "mimicry" (the symbolic act of raising the same national flag on a 
different soil). But the very fact is that, the perceptual capacity of flag-raising in 
the capital Beijing, and in the regional SAR, varies substantially. The enhanced 
flag-raising starting 2002 was soon criticized as "slack", "informal", and "not 
solemn", bearing colonial traits of playing traditional Scottish music by a bagpipe 
band25，也ough some might see it as bearing features distinctive with rituals of 
other Chinese cities^^. The incident of the ritual on the New Year Day in 2002 
invited criticism from tourists and leftists, for a cleaning lady was grooming the 
floor of the Square during the ceremony, and as the ceremony played no national 
anthem at that time, the grooming noise was explicit and disrespectful to the 
solemnity of the ritual. The government was said to take the ritual as a mere 
routine, and disrespectful to it.^ ^ What underlies is that the ritual is simply "not 
“The Sun, January 9&10，2002; Apple Daily, January 18, 2003 ； it was also reported that flag 
raisers were criticized as ‘too fat'. (October 2，2002 Sing Tao Daily) 
26 Inside Story, ATV, March 24，2002 
27 Ming Pao, Jan 3, 2002 
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qualified enough as 'Chinese'", or "a shame to the State". 
The criticism formally marked a new phase. When mimicry fails, it brings 
about an expectation onto Hong Kong, that is, she should not be just the mimesis, 
but also the standardized. The subjectivity of Hong Kong is confronted by the 
reciprocal gaze of Other from China. She is now under mounting surveillance 
from the State centre, in this case, in terms of the execution of her national 
identity in a political ritual. In face of that, Hong Kong soon needs to relocate 
)o 
herself in anOther position ready for assimilation, an act predominantly erosive 
to her subjectivity. As a result, special arrangement was announced on April 2002 
to modify the original plan, which has just been practiced permanently for not 
more than three months. It was decided that the criticized ceremony was soon 
replaced by a revised version of enhanced flag-raising, adding in the playing of 
national anthem, and to be conducted according to a Beijing flag-raising 
schedule29. However, it should be noted that the prompt reaction is still far from 
the total standardization. The government was still reluctant to follow the time of 
flag-raising and lowering as standardized by the mainland Observatory^^. Hong 
Kong has her own time of practice, set at Sam and 6pm respectively. 
In short, the mimicry does not carry within itself a threat to the Anglo-Hong 
Kong or Sino-Hong Kong differences, as proposed by Bhabha as a tactic against 
the colonizer. Instead, the localization of the ritual is merely a result of a 
political-economic consideration to bring forth economic advantages. The 
so-called mimicry is simply a modeling upon China, surfaced, blunted and 
28 The one being both another position, at the same time, turning her to be an ‘Other’ for China. 
29 Enhanced ceremony on the ll"' and 21®' day of every month has the same schedule as 
Beijing's. The revised version includes a 46-member police band, 10 riflemen escorted 5 flag 
raisers. 21-member Hong Kong Police Band will perform in the end. On other days, 5 police 
officers conduct the raising. 
Decided by the time of sunrise and sunset 
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undisturbing. The above analysis deliberately adopts a "mimesis" to Bhabha's 
terminology, compares the potential tactics of ambivalence and mimicry as power 
deconstruction against colonizers. It contrasted with the surfaced mimicry that 
Hong Kong employs to use flag-raising as a way to pass as Chinese. It is the 
ultimate goal to highlight the fact that, decolonization in Hong Kong does not 
work as liberation or re-enforcement of local subjectivity, but invites more 
assimilation to a totalising national culture along her path to succumb to the 
political intervention and economic decoy of the State. This brings her into the 
next stage. 
4.3.3 Stage Three: Relocation (2003 and after) 
The political implications of flag-raising is revived and retroacted only after it has 
been appropriated into a seemingly 'mistaken genre' (MacAloon, 1984), the 
tourist spectacle. There is a need to put the ritual back onto the right track. 
Relocation is the stage in which the ritual's political origin is adjusted. It is a 
result from mounting state surveillance. Since late 2002，series of official moves 
were exercised in order to embed the ritual with more political significance. 
On December 1，2002, the China Armed Police Band visited Hong Kong and 
co-conducted the flag-raising ritual with the local Police for the first time. The 
event attracted a lot of spectators with compliments on "the flag raisers and living 
landmarks of the Tiananmen Square in Beijing."^' This is a "learning process" of 
Hong Kong, in which Hong Kong humbly reckons the State centre as the role 
model of the ritual as well as the representation of authentic Chinese-ness, a way 
far unlike her mimesis in the previous stage. 
In October 2003, the Hong Kong Police Band responsible for the flag-raising 
31 HK GIS Press Release; November 28，2002 
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ritual, visited Beijing and performed in a public parade organized by an officially 
organized seminar on economic co-operation between Beijing and Hong Kong; it 
is considered an "alternative way for mainland people to understand more about 
Hong Kong".32 
Cultural exchanges of this sort, though not explicitly publicized as "learning", 
are ways of assimilation and official programming of resinicization. Flag-raising 
ritual now becomes one of these indispensable programs. All of a sudden, the 
political significance of the ritual to the local population has "come back". Still, 
economical force could not be disavowed; perhaps it is the one that continues to 
dominate. It is because the above occasion was overwhelmed with mainland 
tourists33. 
In August 2003, the national woman volleyball team of China visited Hong 
Kong in a cultural exchange program. The trip included a respect paying to the 
daily flag-raising ritual, the first time for a national organization to do so. Again, 
the political significance of the ritual was re-established in this seemingly cultural 
act: in an interview, the coach of the national team said, "although I was in Hong 
Kong, an environment very different from the Tiananmen Square in Beijing, but 
when I saw the flag being hoisted gradually, my affection did not change [despite 
the spatial difference], I felt the same restlessness.，’34 The master narrative of the 
ritual, its urge for a national "sameness" and standardization, is now coming to 
terms with the changing nature of the local ritual which successfully invites the 
intended and appropriate reaction from the audience. 
More activities were organized to relocate the ritual with its retroactive 
32 Xinhua News Net, October 18，2003 
Locals attended, too, but without exact record of headcounts. News report of Phoenix TV 
claimed a total of 1000 visitors, who were quoted as saying the exchange was "the glory of Hong 
Kong". (December 2，2002, phoenixtv.com) 
34 Wenwei Bao, September 2003; my emphasis 
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political origin. In the sixth anniversary of handover in 2003，a large-scale 
exhibition about the national anthem, emblem and national flag of the PRC, was 
brought to Hong Kong from The National Museum of China for the first time. It 
was one of the handover celebration activities. In the exhibition pamphlet it writes, 
"This exhibition is to unfold the episodes behind the naissance of the national flag, 
emblem and anthem of the PRC through the display of the selected photos and 
artefacts. There is also a section for displaying the Museum's collection related to 
the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). It 
is hoped that the exhibition will enable our visitors to have a better understanding 
of the origin and implication of these symbols of our motherland and the place 
where we are living." 
The exhibition ends with a large display of the handover ceremony in 1997， 
which shows a picture of the flag-raising during the event. A display screen loops 
the video documentation of the ritual at that time, and is placed beside the display 
board. In this way, the exhibition ends with a glorious atmosphere of national 
triumph of sovereignty return. At the same time, the ritual's master narrative of a 
unified national identity is enforced. 
The exhibition is indeed a means to enhance the civic/ national education 
among Hong Kong citizens. Tightly connected to the handover celebration, the 
political significance and respect of the symbols are reminded. What's more, the 
co-organiser, Education and Manpower Bureau lined up primary and secondary 
school teachers to join a "learning tour" of the ritual, itinerary included a morning 
trip to the ritual in the Golden Bauhinia Square, followed by a short seminar about 
ritual and national education, then followed by a guided tour to the exhibition. The 
tour has offered some trained students as the tour guide; a civil organization, 
Association of the Hong Kong Flag Guard, was invited to provide training to the 
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students before hand. In this way, these activities were built around a thematic of 
national education through enhancing knowledge and respect on the flag-raising 
ritual. The ritual is relocated to a more sacred position than that of a tourist 
attraction. Its political origin and symbolic significance is retroacted. 
Truly, the year of 2003 and thereafter, has marked a significant watershed in 
local socio-political development and the Sino-Hong Kong relations. Transborder 
distance is once again being closed down; intervention and surveillance of the 
State centre onto local issues is said to be mounting. First comes the changing of 
State leadership of the PRC and the governmental reform of accountability of 
principal officials in 2002, the continual weakening performance of local 
leadership has rendered people's looking up onto the young and more accessible 
central leadership. The visit of the new Premier Wen Jiabao to Hong Kong in July 
2003 after the SARS outbreak has further broken the ice of local resentment to the 
communist China whose refreshing outlook of democracy, economic strength, 
creativity and openness has successfully appealed to the locals. Occasional events 
to stir the nationalist feelings of Hong Kong people could also be found during 
these years: national soccer team in competition with the visiting soccer team The 
Real Madrid in August 2003, the visit of the national hero, astronaut Yang Li-wei 
in October 2003，the signing of the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement 
Agreement (CEPA) between China and Hong Kong in June 2003^^ and the 
further relaxation of mainlanders' individual visit visa to Hong Kong starting from 
the late 2003, have all convinced a closing of social distance between people of 
the two places, a Sino-Hong Kong relation "CEPA-rised". 
35 The signing of the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) between China and Hong 
Kong ensures a closer distance and more flexible mobility in aspects of the social, political, 
economical, and probably cultural between the two places (CEPA also covers cultural business like 
movie industry). 
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Nevertheless, the National People's Congress Standing Committee's twice 
interpretations on partial articles of the Basic Law, the controversy of the 
introduction of Ordinance 23, the July rally 2003，the argument of "defining 
patriotism" in 2004，and the more recent renunciation of universal suffrage for the 
2007/08 elections, have on the one hand, become the variables in the rapid 
development of the Sino-Hong Kong "CEPA-risation", demonstrating to the 
central government the claim of Hong Kong to retain autonomy and democracy, 
while leading to a significant intensification of central intervention to local issues. 
The July 广 rally has sparked off changes of how the central government 
intervenes to the local society and political structure. China believes in using 
economic advantages and growth as an effective way to resole political crisis; 
what followed the rally were thus series of tactics like the signing of CEPA and 
the relaxation of travelling quotas; "the Sino-Hong Kong political boundary is 
under re-alignment." (Chan, 2003) On the other hand, people, mostly from the 
"pro-China" camp, have grabbed the chances to publicize an urgent need of more 
implementation of national education program, a way deemed necessary to avoid 
similar controversies against the central government from happening again. Xu Ze, 
Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, has stated clearly "after the 
July ist rally, the central government has seriously reviewed the profound issues of 
Hong Kong's development; it is decided that there is a necessity to strengthen the 
education of national history, national issues and the Basic Law."^^ Criticism of 
the lack of enforcement of flag-raising ritual in local schools has entered into the 
controversy of "patriotism isue’，〕？. Flag-raising ritual is now regarded as the 
"indicator" of patriotism，widely publicized as the appropriate means of 
36 Ming Pao, September 29, 2003 
” See next chapter 
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expressing national affection, where neglect of its significance might have to bear 
political consequences. 
From a low-key routine to a high-sounding means to boost local tourism; 
from an autonomous local exercise to a closely-monitored political act, 
flag-raising ritual has been conducted in a localized manner, but gradually tuning 
to a national mode of political significance. It demonstrates a trajectory of 
assimilation of national symbol into the locality of Hong Kong, it also 
demonstrates how the commercialization of the Chinese identity is retroacted to 
become the institutionalization of the Chinese identity, embodied in the 
participation of the ritual. All these have been exercised in slippage of the master 
narrative of the ritual. Despite the master narrative is so strongly embedded in the 
national ritual, the Sino-Hong Kong identification in the postcolonial context 
renders it at odds, re-inscribing it along the localization process. 
4.3.4 Political Will and the Force of Negotiation 
For this reason, the final settlement of the ritual in Hong Kong may result in either 
a creative re-inscription of the ritual, or, an "original" national exercise highly in 
tune with the State. Affirmation of a national identity is the "official destination" 
of the ritual as ideal yet distant as a political mission: when the Chinese identity is 
neither commercialized nor institutionalized, but highly ritualized; When without 
official regulatory means, without warning from the Pro-China camps, without 
economic lure, local population routinizes the implementation of flag-raising 
ritual as a habitual expression of a national identity. Yet, the negotiating force 
against this political will be the continual development of the Sino-Hong Kong 
distance and the unique historicity of Hong Kong. 
With the accumulative data starting 1997, this study could only locate and 
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describe the aforesaid stages. There might be possibilities that more different 
stages of development are invited before coming to the final closure in any form. 
Prediction of this sort is beyond the capability of the data of this study. 
4.4 Conclusion 
Flag-raising ritual in Hong Kong criss-crosses on the road of localization and 
assimilation. The development of the ritual serves as a symbolic transition of the 
decolonized Hong Kong to her nationalization. The ritual was first introduced to 
the locality with ambivalent discourse, then localized in form of mimicry to China, 
followed by a re-adjustment of the transformation, and finally heading towards its 
final settlement in local culture as the power representation of the nation. With a 
stable and strong master narrative, the national ritual should have served the 
nourishment of nationalist feelings, but it was rather played down or even emptied 
out in the first place. It was not until the transborder distance and the Sino-Hong 
Kong relationship underwent subtle changes and gradual enhancement, when the 
State's surveillance to the local mounted up, that the stages of the ritual's 
development, the corresponding re-adjustment of ritualistic features, and the 
nationalistic narratives the ritual carries within, started to synchronize and align 
with the reviving master narrative. (Fig. 1) To the political ideal, the nationalistic 
narrative may get more stabilized and articulated, the ritual's features more in tune 
with the mainland version, and that is when state surveillance on the local 
execution of the ritual will no longer be necessary; the ritual moves away from a 
trajectory of the commercialization and institutionalization of the Chinese national 
identity, to the ritualization of Chinese national identity. National identity will be 
fully embedded in the ritualistic act, collectively recognized and participated. The 
spectacle and the act-out of the ritual create habitual response to a national 
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narrative, without which a nation could not be sustained in the imaginary 
continuum. Nevertheless, the political will to affirm a stable national identity 
negotiates with the development of the ritual so sensitive to the Sino-Hong Kong 
relations. The subsequent trajectory of the ritual, which may or may not be of a 
linear sort (as any changes in the historicity and postcoloniality of Hong Kong 
may result in the regression of the trajectory), is waited to be seen. 
Also, the above analysis derives more problematics of the Sino-Hong Kong 
identification as exposed by the development of the ritual: 
Firstly, flag-raising ritual becomes a contingent signifier of the Chinese 
identity. There is no natural sign to fix the identity of the decolonized Hong Kong 
or to fix the differences between China and Hong Kong. As a result, Hong Kong 
attempted to deploy 'mimicry', as shown in the rhetoric of the ritual which strived 
to be authentic, to pass as Chinese，her retroactive origin. This 'passing as 
Chinese' of the decolonized-yet-endo-colonized land, is shown to be more 
disturbing than resisting to the State power. 
Secondly, flag-raising ritual produces and is reproduced by, the shifting 
relationships between the State power and the cultural periphery of Hong Kong. 
The changing forms, contents and discourses of the ritual enrich the study of the 
political economy of Hong Kong, and the mutual identification process between 
the State and the local. 
Thirdly, national sentiment and sense of nationhood is at best both a political 
and economic asset to Hong Kong. Firstly, it is only in the flag-raising ritual, that 
mainland tourists are urged to retrieve a sense of home in a 'foreign land'. 
Discourse on 'brotherhood'/ 'the same blood' (tongbao) has been playing a major 
role in positioning flag-raising as an important mainland tourist attraction. 
MacCannell suggests that when people travel to the great tourist sites, they are in 
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fact worshipping their own society. (Lash & Urry 1994: 256) Here, reclaiming the 
sense of home in flag-raising is paradoxically an 'exoticization without exotics'. 
That is, the exoticized Chinese-ness of the newly returned Hong Kong is in fact 
nothing but part of the Chinese-ness that the tourists embody. 
Fourthly, the reciprocal identification of the "transient visitors" (the mainland 
people) and the "permanent population" (the Hong Kong locals) are facilitated by 
the politicized transborder mobility. On the one hand, watching flag-raising in the 
Golden Bauhinia Square is now almost an exclusive tourist activity. The ritual 
locates "mainland tourists" (who are willing to spend) in Hong Kong, and further 
marginalizes "mainlanders" (who are unable to "terminate their vacations" and 
stay in arrears). On the other hand, visits made by the strong surge of mainland 
tourists help identify the locals who are economically dependent on their visits, 
and politically dependent on their endorsement of authentic Chinese-ness in the 
ritual; yet at the same time, the locals are almost absent from the ritual. More 
detailed analysis will be disclosed in the next chaoter. 
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Chapter Five Situational Staging of Flag-raising Ritual 
The previous chapter delineates the temporal "stages" that national flag-raising 
goes through in the post-1997 Hong Kong in order to become the major political 
ritual, and as a means of national building. From an ambivalent embedment into 
the political culture in the wake of the handover, the ritual receives gradual 
transformations and is now getting on the road of standardization with legitimacy 
endowed by the central government. 
5.1 Stages of Ritual 
This chapter is shifting the focus from the temporal dimension to the situational 
dimension. As discourses on nationalism "have been crafting new spaces of 
identity for local Hong Kongers" (Ma, 2000:175), flag-raising ritual being one of 
the new spaces requires analysis focuses on the site in which it is operated，on 
which identities are performed, where identification to the local and the nation is 
situated. While the previous temporal delineation generalizes the ritual in its 
official site of the Golden Bauhinia Square, the following situational delineation ‘ 
attempts to specify more sites such as the symbolic sites in media and art 
representation, and physical sites other than the Square such as schools. 
It is going to understand the ritual with a dramaturgical approach: ritual as 
"cultural performance" (Singer, 1972; Turner, 1988; Burke, 1989). Each 
performance has a definitely limited time span, an organized program of activity, 
an occasion, groups of social actors, an audience, and a text. But unlike aesthetic 
performance, the study of the interactions of these elements reveals something 
more than simply textual, but of the social relationships between them. Both text 
and actions, structures of symbol and habits of the body, illocutionary and 
prepositional force, social construction of reality and the representation, are to be 
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considered. Derived from this dramaturgical approach, another meaning of 
"stages" is henceforth proposed, that is, the situational dimension of the ritual, the 
social-cultural situations on which the cultural performance (national flag-raising) 
is "staged". 
Let's take an example: a Hong Kong lawyer was quoted in 1997 by saying 
that, every time he saw the national flag-raising in the mainland, his legs quivered 
and himself loaded with tremendous fear. However, when he saw Chinese 
sportsmen being awarded in international campaigns, and there he saw the 
national flag-raising alongside the national anthem, his eyes could not help but fill 
with tears. The difference of reaction was said to be the result of local 
ambivalence towards the handover�But more importantly, it is the two "stages" 
of the cultural performance (the former an enforcement of political power within a 
nation, the latter a festive proclamation of cultural victory in the international 
context) from the seemingly same act (hoisting the national flag), that adopt 
different rhetorical force, preset different expectations, operate within different 
cultural frames that lead to the different act-out of the audience. The act-out, both 
physical and emotional, refracts the content of identification in which people 
adhere to; in this case, the resistance to political allegiance in the former, and in 
the latter, a "plain national affection"^ (Chan, 2003) that embraces China and 
Chinese from a cultural-historical point-of-view. 
In this way, a simple question of “how does flag-raising ritual work in Hong 
Kong" can be elaborated into a "stage-specific" way. On which stage does 
flag-raising lead to a patriotic society? Does flag-raising in media representation 
lead to a patriotic society more likely than flag-raising in schools? Dan Sperber, 
‘Chinese, June 1997, Issue 7, pp 61 
2 MingPao, March 2, 2004 
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with his epidemiology of representation (1996)，asks why some representations 
are more catching than others. 
5.2 Schudson: How Culture Works? 
But to be able to understand a single cultural performance in a complex social 
structure, and to assess its cultural power and process of communication, one will 
risk being caught in an epistemological struggle, between viewing culture as 
structurally set and maintained, in which cultural performance is a mirror to the 
social setting, and viewing culture as a public resource, where cultural 
performance can be both reflective and reflexive. Michael Schudson's study of the 
efficacy of symbols (1989)，resolves these two extremes with a breakthrough 
position, and sheds new lights on how culture works. 
In the two extremes in defining culture, one adapts the Marxist tradition and 
development of the "dominant ideology" thesis, which says culture and cultural 
objects are "simply derived from the interests of powerful social groups" for 
molding ideas and beliefs (Schudson, 1989:155). Culture is structurally set and 
maintained. It is imposing and manipulating. 
On the very far side there lies another view of culture, which sees it as a 
"public resource": culture works only when individual use it. Swidler (1986) calls 
culture a "tool-kit". The term exposes the optimism in viewing human activity as 
active and voluntaristic. In contrary with the Marxist tradition, this end sees 
culture not as a set of ideas imposed, but a set of ideas available for use. "Culture 
is a resource for social action more than a structure to limit social action." 
(Schudson, 1989:155) The Weberian thought of "rational instrumentality" is 
grounded as such. 
Similar to the Gidden's project, Schudson succumbs to a midway position to 
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give credit both to "structure" and "agency". He further explains that 
neo-Marxists and neo-Weberians today become criss-crossed and bridged. In 
media studies, he says, "many scholars have argued that ideas 'reinforce' more 
than they 'change' people's prior views and habits and actions." (ibid.: 157) In this 
way, both social structure and individual social action are valued in creating an 
interactive mechanism of human behavior. When attempting to explicate how 
culture works, therefore, Schudson takes into consideration of both the context 
and the act. 
Schudson develops further, and introduces a new problematic. Why does 
culture sometimes "work" but sometime it doesn't? "Sometimes the media 
cultivate attitudes, sometimes not; sometimes music transforms or transfixes, 
sometimes not [...]" (ibid.: 158) In short, he suspects the rules and the power (in 
positivistic research the power becomes the effect) of culture cannot be 
generalized but should be seen according to specific culture frame. The 
determinant here is the "susceptibility of people to culture", which is not merely 
natural but dependent "on the circumstances of their life at a given moment.” 
(ibid.: 158，my emphasis) To put it in another way, why are some cultural forms 
and objects are more powerful in some cultural circumstances, but less potent in 
others? "Why are some representations more catching than others"? 
The problematic grounds itself in the belief that no cultural object work with 
everyone: the study of polysemy has suggested that no object has only one 
message nor can their authors normally control which message an audience 
receives or even which audience receives a message. Again, the "tool-kit" thesis 
of culture relies heavily on people's interpretation and choices of objects, symbols, 
and more importantly, meanings (where "message" can no longer stand on its 
own). Yet, it is only within the "circumstances of their life at a given moment", 
-67-
that perception and analysis in a society is shaped. 
Schudson's enlightenment lies in that, while he maintains this mid-way belief 
in the cultural debate, he adds in another middle position. That is, a 
cultural-socio-specific approach to explain how culture works. Unlike the 
positivist approach to quest whether or not culture works, we are to follow this 
mid-way trajectory to find out the specific conditions that make possible the 
culture or cultural object to work more or less. 
Hence, the following analysis of the flag-raising ritual grounds itself in such 
epistemological position. The prime question may thus become a comparative one, 
such as to expose why flag-raising lead to a "more patriotic society" in other parts 
of China than in the post-1997 Hong Kong, given the cultural-socio-specificity of 
Hong Kong's de-colonization and post-colonial hybridity. 
Here, I suggest a new point of departure in answering the question: the 
specific "circumstances and moments" that Schudson applied to explain the 
shaping of people's susceptibility to cultural information, are to be understood in 
term of the "stage"; the susceptible people in reception and reaction become both 
the agentive "audiences" and "actors"; the programmed act-out of cultural 
information is thus the performance. Audiences, actors, and the performance itself, 
all operate within, and are thus defined by, both a physical stage (a solid space of 
conduct for an occasion) and a mental stage (a cognitive boundary mapping out 
appropriate identification and acting that corresponds the physical stage). The 
union of these elements works out stage-specific meanings. The focus on 
performance allows us to understand situations interactively, not in terms of 
communication models, but in terms of participatory ones. (Hughes-Freeland, 
1998) 
In this way, what are the stages on which people participate to flag-raising? 
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This leads us to explicate the various stages on which the ritual acts. The variety 
of the stage results in the multiple staging of identifications of being Chinese - to 
follow Schudson's thoughts, no message can be conclusive out of a cultural act or 
symbol, so as the identification process in a national-building project; despite a 
strong master narrative that flag-raising tries hard to convey, people receive it and 
thereby act in various manners according to the stages they situate. On which 
stage of flag-raising national identification finds its potency and on which stage it 
receives the most resistance? Will there be a stage whose identification of being 
Chinese is different from that on another stage? Or, the master narrative of the 
rituaP is simply all encompassing on all different stages? This is what this study 
attempts to find out. 
It is not the task of this qualitative study to compare the strength of the 
multiple identifications on different staging. The focus should rather be put in the 
present circumstances of the Hong Kong society that allows such multiple staging 
to come into beings and operate. Multiple staging is the specificity of Hong Kong; 
postcoloniality is her "circumstances and moments". 
In short, the following study locates various stages of flag-raising as the act 
of identification; it can be strong or weak, and it can be legitimate or illegitimate. 
From the act of identification, one can derive the substantive content with which 
people identify. The content varies according to the different acts, which make up 
the multiple staging of identification. 
5.3 Multiple Staging 
By multiple staging it suggests various sites where the ritual is operated. Four 
3 A symbolic restoration of power of the central government, and a symbolic proclamation of a 
Chinese identity, (see last chapter) 
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stages of this kind could be traced: recurrent calendrical ceremony, media 
event, tourist spectacle, and voluntary social program. The first three operate 
under official programming, in which people's attendance to the ritual is counted 
as the most significant participation. The last stage is relatively more civic-driven, 
where people's actual act of raising the flag is also expected and considered (for 
example, flag-raising in schools); despite it also operates under official guidance, 
unofficial programming could sometimes be found (for example, flag-raising in 
art representation). 
1. Recurrent Calendrical Ceremony: twice a year performed in a specially 
enhanced and large-scale way, where government officials and invited citizens 
attend at the Bauhinia Square. 
2. Tourist Spectacle: daily routine every morning as a political ritual, and also a 
tourist attraction for mostly mainland tourists. 
3. Media Event: mediatized ritual including the relay of the 1997 handover ritual, 
media coverage of the recurrent calendrical ceremony in subsequent years, 
and ritual as a media icon. 
4. Voluntary Civic Program: a continuum of the ritual in the everyday life of the 
citizens. 
The four stages are inter-related, mutually produce consequences to the 
creation and development of the others. For example, the making of media event 
is dependent on the live event of the ceremony, which also can be regarded as one 
of the tourist gaze. Voluntary civic program reproduces the discourse of national 
building and also resists it. What's more, different social actors and audiences 
appropriate and inscribe the ritual in different manners on their corresponding 
stages, and have led to the conspicuous efforts of the different staging to negotiate 
and contest its master narrative, the symbolic significance of building up a nation. 
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Apparently, tourists as the social actor in the stage of "tourist spectacle" act 
differently from a local artist who performs the ritual in an aesthetic performance 
on the stage of "civic program". The following will detail with more analysis. 
5.4 Dimensions of cultural power 
The five dimensions that Schudson uses to examine how culture works are 
retrievability, institutional retention, resonance, rhetorical force, and, resolution. It 
is here visualized in a pentagon of potency (Fig. 2), the fuller in all aspects 
(conceptually explained by strengths of three levels, namely, weak, medium and 
strong), the more comprehensive the potency is. Borrowed from Schudson, the 
pentagon is going to be used as a theoretical metaphor to visualize these features 
of cultural power, their relationships and interactions, which make up the strength 
of particular cultural symbol. It serves as a conceptual map-out rather than a chart 
consisted of quantifiable arms of structure. For it is not the aim of this study to 
quantify the elements of cultural power. Nevertheless, this theoretical metaphor is 
to be supported by qualitative empirical data, which in turn, can be further 
explained by such theorization. 
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Retrievability: how available a cultural object/ act is; if it can reach and expose 
itself to the largest possible amount of people in society. Retrievability is all 
economical, social and cultural. Economically, a cultural object or cultural 
information is more retrievable if it does not cost people much to retrieve. Socially, 
either the physical reach or the temporal reach will render the cultural act more 
accessible to the awareness and memory of an individual. 
"It seems obvious that culture works better if it is brought into the physical 
presence of a potential audience, and that it has more lasting impact if it is 
incorporated into a culturally sanctioned form of pubic memory such as the 
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calendar," explains Schudson. (1989:163，my emphasis) To be able to let people 
retrieve, the cultural information should catch their attention and be impressively 
stored in their cognitive system. 
The tactics or, the politics of retrievability is thus, how to make some key 
elements of culture more available to the audience; and equally important is who 
to manipulate this tactics. That turns us to the second feature of political potency, 
institutional retention. 
Institutional Retention: If cultural objects are institutionalized, they have 
found a good shelter of storage and exposure. Cultural efficacy requires 
institutional relevance and sponsorship. "Social institutions not only preserve and 
pass on in powerful ways the culture they certify but they act as gatekeepers in the 
certification process itself." (ibid.: 171) Some cultural acts are more 
institutionalized thus advocated because they are upheld by social systems of 
schooling (verse speaking vs. hip-hop rapping, for example); a commissioned 
artist is more recognized than independent artists in terms of artistic achievements. 
Schudson concludes, the more thoroughly a cultural object is institutionalized, the 
more likely it exerts influence; to disregard it would possibly invite punity. 
Rhetorical force: As a communicative act, a cultural object should be able to 
put its message across in a powerful and impressive way. A ritual is more moving 
than another simply because its rhetoric is more memorable, such as the music 
and the human gesture it adopts. Rhetorical force becomes the textual tactics of 
persuasion in cultural information; it makes up the "quality" of a cultural object. 
In our case of flag-raising ritual, the quality is undoubtedly solemnity. 
Of course, it is difficult to locate and assess how forceful the rhetoric is, for it 
is also a matter of the receiver (who may be more open or resisting, who define 
qualities, such as "interesting" and "boring" differently) and the situation (the 
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format, medium and location make the act varies in response, they also expect 
differently from the act). So, rhetorical force is rather relational to aspects of the 
above. What can be sure is that, it is a virtue of "contrastive" relation to other 
objects in the field, either by means of conversation (establishing connection to 
other objects in the field) or displacement (replacing others so as to get into the 
agenda). In this way, a cultural object exists relationally to others in the field so as 
to get into the cultural agenda. 
Resonance: How relevant is a cultural object to the public? The relationship 
is more than a private one. It is a public social relation, created in a cultural 
manner, between the object, the audience, and the tradition. This is to say, the 
resonance of a cultural object to the society comes from the interests within a 
cultural frame that also creates such communicative act. That relates to the content 
of the act, and also its position in the cultural tradition of the society where it 
locates its audience. Tradition also implies the durability and accumulation of the 
act over time. 
Flag-raising in post-1997 Hong Kong becomes a particular case as far as 
tradition is concerned. It is a "new tradition" (Hobsbawm, 1983). The paradox lies 
in the fact that, Hong Kong's colonial reminiscence is to be replaced by the 
revival of traditional Chinese culture which have created strong ethnical ties in 
between. Yet, the Chinese tradition (and the tradition of raising national flag) 
cannot be fully re-settled in Hong Kong's decolonization, which becomes a brand 
new official practice in the society. In this situation, the cultural frame that 
flag-raising has to take care of, or by which it is created, is a complex and hybrid 
one. 
The complex cultural frame can be further understood in terms of two 
different qualifiable elements of resonance, that is, the resonance can be both 
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political and cultural, respectively responding to (and constituting) the political 
culture and the culture of people's everyday lives. The "new tradition" can be 
more politically resonant to the political culture of a newly set-up SAR 
government on the official stage of the handover anniversary celebration, but does 
not have the same resonance among locals who do not consider the ritual as 
indispensable in their daily lives; and the ritual can be more culturally resonant to 
the pedagogical practices. Political resonance and cultural resonance is on 
continual structural negotiation. 
Resolution: How directive is a cultural act to instigate actions, if there is a 
clearly stated response that the act desires. Low resolution suggests the act is 
unlikely to stimulate action in concrete, visible, immediate and measurable ways. 
Yet, the problematic lies in the fact that the exercise of such cultural power can 
also be found in the long run, in a gradual way. 
Interestingly, a ritual is a particular communicative act. Its desired response 
is ambivalent with the act itself. That is to say, the viewer is also the actor, the 
audience is also the participant, and thus the act is also the desired action expected 
from the audience. Participation to ritual is simultaneously the act and the action; 
"culture is simultaneously attended to, institutionalized, and resolved in action." 
(ibid.: 173) 
Ritual with high resolution instigates action. It is more likely to invite people 
to participate in this cultural performance and realizes the act and its meaning in 
full. Here, it is suggested that resolution has potency in carrying out performance, 
in bringing in acr-ivity to realize the dramaturgical display of culture. 
However, Schudson does not include emotional reaction as resolution. How 
emotion and behaviour negotiates in cultural performance, particularly in a 
political ritual which calls for affection to the country, invites interesting 
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observations in the following analysis. 
Here, it further categorizes Schudson's delineation: The first two dimensions 
as political-potent, for they employ more tactics and are more dependent on, and 
supported by political force, a cultural power leaning to this tendency suggests 
that it is structurally more dominating and stable to fix the social setting in which 
the power exercises 一 it has the ability to gain legitimacy, control and power; the 
third and the forth as cultural-potent, which suggests a cultural power more 
inclines to influence and represent the cultural setting in which the power 
exercises 一 it has the ability to represent, shape, or reinforce culture. The last 
one, resolution, is performance-potent, for a cultural power with this tendency is 
more capable of extricating the performative element of culture - it has the ability 
to display culture via repetitive utterance of spectacle. (Fig. 2) Yet, such 
delineation is contingent as a mere analytical tool, and its effectiveness is rather 
cultural specific. In country like Germany and Japan, where its political domain 
and cultural domain are mutually embedded and dependent, the demarcation 
between different kinds of potency becomes futile. Yet, in the case of Hong Kong, 
who has been regarded as a functional and apolitical city even since her 
colonization, the political domain and the cultural domain have long been 
deprived of close connection (Lui, 2002). More detailed categorization as such is 
more sufficient to assess the cultural power of particular cultural act in respond to 
the complex social contexts. 
-76-
5.5 Pentagon in Multiple Staging of Flag-raising 
To examine the cultural power of different staging of flag-raising, it is to apply the 
above criteria to the official and unofficial stages of the ritual: 
5.5.1 Tourist spectacle 
On this stage, the social actors are tourists, mostly mainland tourists, and the local 
Tourism Board. It is an official scene, with the purpose of boosting local economy 
by wielding the power of the political economy of flag-raising ceremony as the 
"spectacular" of post-1997 Hong Kong. 
Since 1997，the ritual has become a morning daily routine in the Bauhinia 
Square, symbolically asserts the power of rule everyday, and starts the day for the 
city. In October 2001，however, the ritual was first made into a tourist attraction in 
a seemingly determined and high profile manner. It was announced that, in order 
to "attract more tourists", the Hong Kong Tourism Board has requested the Hong 
Kong Police (responsible for the operation of the daily ritual) to "enhance the 
flag-raising ceremony”*. A trial run was held in every Friday of that October; the 
satisfactory result was assured as the enhanced ceremony was allowed to be 
"made permanent" from January 2002 onwards, in government's terms, “for the 
promotion and uplift of the image of Hong Kong”.5 
Now that flag-raising is commodified into a tourist gaze, and overwhelming 
identified by the transient visitors, field work has suggested that those visiting the 
morning rituals are mostly from the mainland^. It is not surprising when drawing 
reference to official data. 2.3 million mainland tourists visited Hong Kong in 1997; 
4.5 million was recorded in 2001，almost a two-third of the total number of 
4 Enhanced ceremony includes police band and riflemen escorted flag raisers. 
5 November 3, 2001; Police Report, PPRB 
6 Conducted in April, 2003 
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visiting tourists from all over the world. The record got nearly 7 million in the 
following year and is predicted to have another million headcounts of growth in 
2003.7 The statistics shows that mainland tourists become the major component 
of local tourism activities. In particular, the Golden Bauhinia Square and 
flag-raising are advertised in sight-seeing routes catering this grouping of visitors, 
such as in mainland touring websites and brochures. Tourist services 'normally 
involves a particular social grouping...to a significant extent different kinds of 
holiday experience are devised with these different social groups in mind.' (Urry, 
1990:25) The particular social experience designed for this social group of 
'mainlanders' normally starts with watching flag-raising in early mornings. 
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Institutional retention is strong on this stage, as it is operated by the highly 
，The prediction was made before the outbreak of SARS. 
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legitimated and institutionalized force of police. More importantly, it is an official 
campaign to put forth the ceremony as a tourist must-see. The government is 
convinced that by doing so, the specificity of Hong Kong's 
one-country-two-system can be fully highlighted. A mixture of east-meet-west 
(SAR flag as the cosmopolitan Hong Kong; the red five-star flag as the Chinese 
tradition) coincides with the tourist policy of campaigning Hong Kong as a 
metropolitan. It is not surprising to note that Hong Kong is the only Chinese city 
(besides the capital) to have promoted the ceremony as a tourist spot, also, the 
only Chinese city to raise two flags simultaneously. To widely publicize the 
National Flag Ordinances, a recent government TV Announcement of Public 
Information (TVAPI) features a group of young tourists, holding cameras and 
taking snapshots under the flags in the Bauhinia Square, to explain the rights and 
responsibilities of the public concerning national flag. The 30-second commercial 
ends with them getting on a tourist coach and leave the square . Flag-raising as 
the tourist spectacle has entered the official discourse of the ritual. But as to be 
shown later, the ritual is rather, officially "mistaken". 
Retrievability is strong, an advantage of strong official back up. Similar to a 
daily routine, the ceremony-as-tourist spot is open to all everyday. It occupies the 
physical social space in an open area of a Square 365 days per year. It is 
announced that "enhanced" ceremony 
will be held every 11^ and every 
month, that means it is inscribed onto the official calendar. In any case, everyone 
could reach the ritual easily. Yet, the problem is, how inviting and instigative these 
arrangements are. To be highly retrievable does not necessarily mean it instigates 
people to act. 
In this case, despite the ritual is inscribed onto the official calendar, the 
8 HKSAR government website: http://www.isd.gov.hk/chi/tvapi/bl takingphoto c.html 
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calendar is rather some kind of travel itinerary for tourists, instead of a social 
calendar that addresses to the local public. Being promoted as a tourist spot, it 
does not enter the agenda of the everyday life of the locals, and is yet to become 
indispensable social activity. In a way, the ceremony is regarded exclusively as a 
tourist activity. It does not prompt participations of the locals. Adding to this is the 
fact that, any disregard of this ceremony does not invite punity (despite the strong 
institutional retention). Resolution is thus low. Disconnection is resulted. Locals 
are almost absent in the ritual; and even if there is any presence, one could not 
deny the possibility that the locals visit the ritual with a tourist mindset, that is, to 
consume it for a gaze, instead of a political pilgrimage because of its official 
tourist-spot outlook. The political nature of the ritual is washed out by the 
distorting tourist gaze. 
A ritual that tends to establish the national identity of the locals is occupied 
by mainland tourists. They are eager to compare the scene with that in the capital. 
Mainland tourists are impressed by the ceremony but still regard the one in 
Beijing the capital as the exemplary. Tourists interviewed at the scene all 
compared the local one with the Beijing version, and sometimes criticized the 
local one as not being solemn and powerful enough^. In the wake of the handover, 
the ceremony is even criticized as inappropriately bearing colonial traits of 
playing traditional Scottish music by a bagpipe For the historical-political 
reasons, the setting of the ceremony hinders audience reception and appreciation 
to its solemnity; the rhetorical force is weak. In a way, mainland tourists' 
9 Field study was conducted on July 1，2002 and April 2003 at the ritual in Bauhinia Square. A 
family from Jiangxi and a woman from Xiaoxin preferred Beijing's ritual as the more solemn 
performance; the latter even pointed out that, though Hong Kong's ritual is "pleasant to watch", 
but it is not solemn as they will stand upright during the course in Beijing but people in the Square 
did not. 
1° The Sun, January 10, 2002; Apple Daily, January 18’ 2003; But in Inside Story, ATV, March 24, 
2002，the trait was described as the Hong Kong style whose feature cannot be found elsewhere in 
other Chinese cities. 
-80 -
"approval" to the ritual is also the endorsement of Hong Kong's legitimate 
Chinese-ness by these "native and more knowledgeable judges of nationhood". 
Similarly, the resonance is neither strong nor connected to the local cultural 
frame. For the tourist spectacle does not converse with the locals but mainlanders 
who have been living under a different cultural surrounding of national education 
and patriotic expression; it is a cultural frame which political resonance and 
cultural resonance speaks glibly to one another. But in the case of Hong Kong, the 
ritual echoes the political flavor of patriotic expression but not the apolitical 
lifestyle of the locals. "Going out to watch flag-raising ceremony as leisure" is 
barely the usual activity of Hong Kong people. It does not constitute a kind of 
cultural activity, but at most an educational effort h . Local gaze is almost absent 
on this stage. Even if there are locals in the scene, they do not participation for the 
desired reason'^. Indeed, to participate in a national ritual is only entering (and in 
return, shaping) the cultural frame of the Hong Kong society. For Hong Kong 
does not have any ritual of such kind during her colonial rule (Ma, 1999). 
In sum, the stage of "tourist spectacle" allows the cultural performance of 
full legitimacy, politically potent to establish itself as the important national/local 
symbol. But at the same time, it has committed a fatal "genre error" (MacAloon, 
1984). However structurally imposing it can be, the ritual does not instigate 
substantial actions and response. The political mission of flag-raising has given 
way to an economic operation to enhance the political economy of Hong Kong; 
the ritual becomes a commercial activity of tourism development. For ritual is a 
“ " I n the wake of the handover, I brought my students along to watch the morning ritual in the 
Bauhinia Square, I might see some local families there, or social workers with their clients (new 
immigrants from mainland), but now, it is getting fewer and fewer people to do so," said Hui 
Chun-lung, chairman of the Association of Hong Kong Flag-guards, in an in-depth interview, (see 
"school flag-raising") 
12 Locals whom I tracked down in the field visited the ritual for various reasons. A pair of old 
couple treated it as an entertaining performance (a "show")； on a Sunday, two local families were 
there supporting their own sons, the police cadets who hoisted the flag. 
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duty, spectacle is a choice. MacAloon (1984) alerts us of the "degeneration" of 
ritual into spectacle, just like "Easter into the Easter Parade". Flag-raising has 
become the exoticized ritual consumed by tourists. It may be perceived as 
spectacles by outsiders who happen upon them. These outsiders commit that 
"genre error" since their roles as observers are not built into the structure of the 
ritual itself. The "genre error" has downplayed the force of national building. 
In this way, the content that one can find within this stage for the locals to 
identify themselves has become an indirect and ironic one: the absence of local 
gaze paradoxically identifies the locals. They are dependent on their "others", the 
mainland tourists, to identify themselves both politically (the mainland tourists 
endorse the legitimacy of the ritual in terms of the rhetoric, thus endorse the 
authentic "Chinese-ness" of Hong Kong), and economically (mainland tourists 
boost local economy by spending their times in Hong Kong, acting out in the 
ritual as the attendants to make the ritual/the trip completed.) 
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5.5.2 Recurrent Calendrical Ceremony 
Incorporated in the cultural calendar are the two important dates of Hong Kong 
history: July the handover anniversary and October the National day. 
Enhanced flag-raising are held on these important dates with special arrangements, 
such as inviting one thousand citizens, governmental officials and guests to attend 
at the Bauhinia Square. Here, the social actors are wide-spanned, from the 
attending citizens to the Chief Executive, from the attending Chinese officials to 
the performing parade units. Interestingly enough, the oppositional groups, which 
stage demonstrations every year outside the scene create another kind of "negative 
ritual". The demonstrators are as well the social actors on this stage. The setting is 
official，with the purpose of commemoration, celebration and upholding of 
solidarity and collective memory. Z � � � 
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On this stage, the ceremony is institutionally operated, retained and 
scrutinized. Its availability, as a result, is politically designed to be full, so that it 
becomes a public ritual for everyone to celebrate. It is highly legitimate and 
indispensable in the society, as the two dates are important social events, without 
which the continual and healthy social development cannot be counted and 
witnessed in a regular manner. By putting forth these calendrical events as a kind 
of cultural situation, a cultural habit is designed to form as people's way of life for 
the sake of solidarity and patriotism. The ritual is operated with absolute political 
intention. 
As a result, the resonance of the event strives to be high, for it responds to, 
on the one hand, the political culture of maintaining social solidarity through 
ritual; on the other hand, the cognitive and emotive needs of the public, the need 
of being adhered to a collective. (Anderson, 1991; Wouter, 2002)13 丁乜。message 
of the ritual is very specific. In a way, it aims at establishing that very cultural 
frame in which it operates. But of course, taking into the consideration of how 
people needs time to get used to a "new tradition", the society is still adjusting to 
frame the ritual as equally important as the dates themselves. After all, there is a 
wide variety of celebratory activities on these two days and flag-raising ritual is 
just one of them. Instead of competing with and displacing other cultural activities 
(for example, the media event of "wenyiwanhui"^'^), flag-raising tends to converse 
with them, though it is the indispensable symbolic celebration. Its resonance is yet 
to be full owing to the busy and diversified agenda of national celebration. 
13 Some elderly whose admission to the ceremony was refused in July 2003 complained at the 
scene, saying he traveled a long way from Tuen Mun to Wan Chai simply with the hope to 
"celebrate together". 
14 Large-scale entertainment gala held in July 1 and October 1 
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Schudson, however, does not go on to give hint on whether resonance will 
increase or decrease upon other socio-cultural factors. So here, it is very possible 
that the resonance of the flag-raising ceremony will be increased as time advances. 
The increase may not be proportional to quantifiable factors like how long Hong 
Kong has been returned to China, but is dependent on the discursive development 
of her identification to China. After a widespread discussion of patriotism both in 
the political and social dimensions in 2003 to 2004*^ the ceremony in July and 
October 2004 might become a focus to look at the possible change of resonance. 
On the other hand, institutional retention, availability, resonance and 
resolution of the ceremony are inter-related in a way. Even though there created 
an incentive and a reminder for the public to attend the ceremony, it is still a 
highly regulated and scrutinized official event. The fact that only some one 
thousand citizens can receive "VIP cards" for admission disappoints others who 
want to take part, which leads to possible resistance, too.'^ There also has been 
saying that, the government has a "blacklist" of unwelcome citizens to flag-raising. 
Refused citizens (one of which a regular demonstrator) were commented as being 
rid of the basic human r i g h t I n 2003, Premier Wen Jiabao's attendance to the 
July 1 ritual has resulted in an exclusion of the ceremony, the public is strictly 
1 8 
prohibited get nearby even to simply watch the ceremony from afar . The need to 
“Discuss ions on whether Hong Kong is patriotic, and what is meant by patriotic, sparked off 
both in the political and the social levels, a result of a government consultation on future political 
reforms, and the increasing economic support and political intervention from the central 
government in Beijing. 
16 In July 1，2002,1 was among a large flock of disappointing citizens who were barred from 
entering the Bauhinia Square without knowing the need of getting a "VIP card" until the police in 
the blockade told us. In April 2003，I asked a man watching the ritual in the Square if he had 
ever been to the July 1 ritual. He simply said "no" and explained in an ironic manner, "because I 
am not ‘those privileged and powerful citizens'." 
17 High-profile street-fighter Lui Yuk-lin, aka. "long-hair woman" was refused admission on the 
2002 National Day ceremony. The Ombudsman condemned the Home Affairs Department (HAD) 
for ridding off her human right of attending the ceremony. HAD apologized to Lui, and the Human 
Rights Monitor Hong Kong welcomed the verdict. 
The government explains it as "security reason" {Oriental Daily, June 25, 2003) 
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maintain the ritual's political sacredness ironically disconnects itself to ordinary 
citizens. That creates a completely contrasting picture in the Western political 
culture 19. 
At the same time, the live transmission of the event in television and other 
media makes the ceremony more "available". The acts of attending in person, or 
the act of viewing TV, are both valued as the desired resolution. Personal 
attendance is no longer the necessary action. If it is the established cultural 
activity of viewing ritual via media relay, the cultural resonance of the live ritual 
is thus comparatively low. 
The ceremony, being an enhanced version in front of important government 
officials and the media eyes, are rhetorically discreet. As a political ritual, it 
composes of, and produces, the quality of solemnity and power. Undoubtedly the 
ceremony is the most powerful in this regard. 
In sum, it is the most legitimate stage of flag-raising and national 
identification. It has the strongest act of identifying the local population along the 
line of official discourse. In the solemnity of the ritual, expressing affections to 
the nation is the only desirable action, a way to identify oneself with the power of 
the nation. The political intention of the political does not allow ways otherwise; 
the content in which people identify with is therefore highly absolute and 
regulated towards the sole cause of nationhood. However, it creates itself among 
the top of the social-political agenda, but yet to be a cultural must-do within the 
context of everyday life exactly because of its intensive regulation. 
19 For example, the public parades during coronation ceremonies in the royal Britain are done "on 
the street", a public space for everyone to cast the gaze and hail the respect. 
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5.5.3 Media Event 
If to regard ritual as another mode of representation, flag-raising as a media event 
then becomes the very (re-)presentation within such representation. Flag-raising 
ritual as a media event includes three kinds of characterization. Firstly, the 
specific flag-raising ritual at the very scene of the handover ceremony in 1997; 
secondly, the transmission and news coverage of the calendrical ritual as 
mediatized ritual in subsequent years; thirdly, flag-raising reduced from its 
ritualistic nature to become a widely used icon in media representation. 
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Both the institutional retention and the reach of the ritual are high. The 
hoisting of the national flag in the handover ceremony in 1997 is still regarded as 
one of the most important globalized events in the century. By globalized it means 
the international attention, the frequency of broadcast and media coverage that the 
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event received at that time. A local Hong Kong Broadcast Consortium was set up 
to cater for the global demand of the relay; nearly 8,400 journalists from 775 news 
organizations were in Hong Kong to report on the historic event, as "this media 
battle of the century is heating up.，’�。In the end, "millions of people switched on 
the television to see the end of colonialism, live on global newscast." (Knight & 
Nakano, 1999:xvii) 
During the ceremony, the flag-raising ritual is highly symbolic to the act of 
handover, with the Chinese national flag and the SAR flag rising after the British 
national flag and the colonial flag of Hong Kong descended. The ritual starts 
precisely at midnight, July 1, and symbolically bringing Hong Kong to cross the 
historical threshold. The speech made by the President of the PRC, the narration 
during live broadcast, and the press stories on the next day, have all endorsed the 
0 1 
ritual with such specific, and highly symbolic, political significance. 
Most of the Hong Kong citizens could not attend the ritual but stayed at 
home to watch live transmission, and so are the people in other parts of the world, 
including mainlanders . For most people in Hong Kong and other parts of the 
world, the ceremony is "only something they could view on their television 
screens, in a real sense this moment of history was a media spectacle, a series of 
images of visual symbols in motion being fed to a global public." (Clark, 2001: 
202) 
In Katz and Dayan's definition of "media event" (1992), the ritual is exactly 
2° Guangzhou Daily, "The battle of the century for Chinese and foreign media", July 1, 1997 
21 The speech opens, "National flag of the PRC and the SAR flag have already been hoisted in 
Hong Kong solemnly. Now, people all over the world have cast their gaze to Hong Kong “ 
(MingPao, July 1，1997); captions of the photo essay of the flag-raising ritual goes "A handover 
ceremony of some twenty minutes can never tell comprehensively the deeper meanings of Hong 
Kong's end of colonial rule and her return to China. The falling of the Union Jack, the rising of the 
Chinese national flag: nothing other than that can bear more substantial and symbolic meanings." 
(ibid.) 
22 Chinese, June 1997, Issue 7’ pp 46-59; Mingpao, June 26，1997 
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put forth in form of "commemoration" and "coronation" (the rite of passage of the 
great). And to echo James Carey who states that "nations live not only in 
historical time but also in media time" (Carey, 1998:44), the establishment of 
Hong Kong as a Chinese city is made possible by this media event of flag-raising. 
What gives it a generic character is that it is transmitted simultaneously or 
extensively by different TV channels. They reach and interrupt mass audience by 
entailing a special significance with the live broadcast. "Media events are thus 
monopoly communications, uncritically reproduced, that function as collective 
rites of communion." (Curran & Liebes，1998:4; my emphasis) Following Katz 
and Dayan, Fung described the hoisting of the flag as "'liminal moments' which 
collectively reflected, idealized, and authenticated a reality or a version of society 
for the public." (Fung, 2001:596) He finds out the strong proliferation of such 
national icon has suppressed the strong discourses of local Hong Kong identity 
but is not powerful enough to "produce a strong desire for re-nationalization" in 
the long run (ibid.) Later, the case study of a local news program further supports 
that the reduction of flag-raising as a political icon in media representation enjoys 
slippage in the production of meaning rather than its quest in national building. 
After the 1997 relay, television broadcast of the calendrical flag-raising 
ceremony on special days continues, and does not obliterate the perpetual 
narrative of the political ritual. It "uncritically reproduces" its legitimacy and 
symbolic political power of claiming national sovereignty over Hong Kong; via 
the transmission, the ritual is available to almost every local TV household, to the 
extent that people rather choose to stay home for the ritual instead of attending it. 
Rhetorically speaking, however, mediatized ritual could not retain as much 
solemnity as in the live one. It has a lesser amount of force to direct participants/ 
audience to the desired response of the ritual. The different narrative genre that 
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mediatized information adopts, such as collage and superimposition, made 
possible by post-production technology, distant itself further with live information. 
Fiske's polysemy (1989) has proven the diversified interpretation that audience 
gives to mediatized cultural information, for television is a semiotically 
democratic experience, "characterized by its openness and polysemy." 
Uncle Hon is a school janitor who is responsible for raising the national flag 
for the school in the two calendrical dates. He was interviewed on the very day of 
October 2003 when he conducted his last ritual before retirement. After this 
morning chores, he returned to his room at Sam and watched the latest news 
coverage of the ritual at the Bauhinia Square. The news not only covered the ritual 
in Hong Kong but also the one in Tiananmen Square, Beijing. There, while 
watching, he recalls his dismay of the Communist Party resulted from his 
childhood plight, instead of exposing himself to the call for national affection by 
the master narrative of the ritual. 
"Of course Beijing (flag-raising) attracts so many people. But I personally do not 
want to go Beijing, otherwise my bad memories would come back to me. I was 
ill-treated and oppressed by the Communist Party (silence)''刀 
The interpretation of the ritual in front of the screen is among the diversified 
expectations and responses that mediatized flag-raising ritual brings about. The 
expectations, which belong solely to this mediated cultural situation, are less 
controlled and regulated that those of the real/live social situation^^. 
23 field observation and interview on Oct 1, 2003 at Yuen Long Government Primary School, Yuen 
Long. 
24 Auslander (1999), in his study of the dialectics of "liveness" and "mediatization", suggests that 
live events are now problematic in face of media technology. It is only when media culture 
becomes pervasive, that the conception of an event being held "live" becomes necessary. Whether 
-90 -
Adding to this is how the 1997 relay ("media event") is gradually reduced to 
"discourse typical of daily news" (Carey, 1998:65), or even a media icon. Apart 
from a narrative of sacredness and commemoration of its collective history, 
calendrical news coverage of the ritual is getting to include resisting informations, 
such as complaints of refused citizens in the vicinity.^^ The fact that the ritual 
becomes a media product under media scrutiny discursively reproduces the ritual 
and its cultural power in the mediascape, entering the socioscape both with 
construction, reproduction or force of renunciation of the social discourse. On the 
one hand, the legitimacy of the ritual is upheld by the media habitual relay, but at 
the same time, the ritual is a media product in which the audience identifies it in 
highly localized perspectives. But as to be shown in the following case study, the 
diffuse rhetoric of mediatized ritual can be an advantage to create multiple 
significations around this symbolic act. 
The resonance of the mediatized ritual is similar to that of the calendrical 
ritual. The former wins over the latter, nevertheless, as the media representation of 
flag-raising is not only calendrical but consistently appears in front of the 
audience in other forms. The media rhetoric dramatizes and amplifies the 
narrative of the ritual (of becoming the sole symbol of political power and 
legitimate Chinese-ness). It also turns it to stand for a wide variety of issues such 
26 27 
as local tourism ，mutual relations of China and Hong Kong , and 
n 
one-country-two-system . It displaces other possible cultural symbol to converse 
with the issues. Or, to argue in another way, the ritual becomes a contingent 
signifier of the Chinese identity; for there is almost no natural sign to fix the 
live event is more "real" than mediatized event thus become one of the problematics arisen. 
25 TVB news, October 1，2003 
26 Metro HK, August 18，2003; TVB evening news, February 23, 2004 
27 Ming Pao, February 18’ 2004 
28 Hong Kong Economic Journal; China Daily (internatinal), February 18, 200^ 
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identity or to fix the differences between the nation and Hong Kong people. 
What's more, Kertzer's idea of "symbolcide of media" (1988) assists us to 
understand how flag-raising ritual successfully connect itself to local culture by 
the erasure of other colonial symbols and rituals in media representation, such as 
the commemoration on the Remembrance Day, birthday of Queen Elizabeth, and 
the hoisting of the Guomindang (Taiwan) flag on October 10. The former used to 
be the yearly news coverage but no more is the case when the ritual was abolished 
after the handover. Instead, flag-raising ritual has replaced it as the media routine 
on an annual basis. Of course, symbolcide cannot be fully accomplished without 
high institutional retention. Highly political tactics is the abolishment of the 
Remembrance Day as a public holiday. 
To further probe into the cultural potency of mediatized ritual, a case study is 
conducted to a RTHK public affairs program Headliner. The transformative 
ability of the ritual in its mediatization is to be exposed by how reflexive, but not 
simply reflective, its media representation can be in regard to the changing social 
setting in Hong Kong. 
Headliner was first broadcasted in April 4, 1989. It is a seasonal weekly 
news program acclaimed for its political satire. The program summarizes 
important local and international news in the corresponding week but in a comical, 
humorous and light-hearted way; minimal news analysis is included^^. One of its 
major features is to use visual and musical montage (the use of image, animation 
and popular songs) as the narration, and more likely, interpretations, to the news 
footage/ stories. 
From 1997 to 2003, seven episodes in the first week of July that covers the 
29 http://wmv.rthk.org.hk/special/headliner/ The official introduction of the program positions it as 
such, plus highlighting its two most popular elements: "news-MTV" and "stand-up comedy news 
commentary". 
-92 -
anniial flag-raising ritual in the Bauhinia Square, are selected to be the subject of 
analysis. The case is significant in exposing one possible media treatment to the 
national ritual: firstly, the program always serves as a weekly news wrap-up (that 
definitely will cover the political ritual for its timely news value, and "critically 
reproduce" its master narrative), but simultaneously it offers "interpretations" by 
the visual and musical narration (that make possible a re-presentation of the ritual 
in manners more than simply news footage.) The following analysis witnesses 
how the national ritual goes beyond its goal of national building to become a 
highly localized "contingent signifier" to Hong Kong people on local issues, crisis 
and identity. 
To examine the mediatization of the ritual by sampling a current affairs 
program instead of its televised relay enables us to capture and describe the ways 
in which the various forms of habitual reportage, and how such habitual reportage 
is capable of turning a live ritual into not just a mediatized version, but a media 
product with diffuse symbolic meanings. 
July 4，1997: Shortly after the all-encompassing handover ceremony in mass 
media, this episode does not include much about the ritual. The segment on the 
ceremony has focused on the speech of the then President Jiang Jiemin, and 
invited guests to make commentary on his speech, and on press freedom in the 
post-1997 Hong Kong. One shot of the flag-hoisting was juxtaposed to the 
fireworks, with the background music singing "a glamorous night sparks off after 
the countdown，’3° 
July 4，1998: Flag-raising animation was used to start the opening jingle of 
the program in the new season. It is symbolic to a new era both to the show and 
Hong Kong. Against the background of the controversy of high-ranked 
3° Party X, (my translation; title originally in Chinese); A song of artist Sammi Cheng 
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government officials' patriotism at that time^', flag-raising ritual in this episode 
became the symbol of problematic patriotism. In a segment called "A praise to the 
handover anniversary", Anson Chan, the then Chief Secretary, and W. K. Lam, the 
then Secretary for Civil Service, were both quoted in their comments on their 
personal affections to flag-raising ceremony and the nation respectively; then, 
news footage of the ritual appeared, with the background singing “I sing you a 
song to touch you heart/ Now you belong to me/ You escape to nowhere." The 
juxtaposition was used to expose the urgent political call for loyalty, patriotism, 
and senses of belonging to the nation. At the same time, it reminds us of the 
political dilemma for principal civil servants of a possible double oath of 
allegiance: showing affections to the nation might seem a betrayal to the local 
interests, particularly if the move is to secure their own political positions. The 
ritual here becomes the materialization of such nation-local negotiation and 
dilemma. 
July 2，1999: The program opens with a festive atmosphere, playing the 
theme song of a popular local sitcom about colloquial Hong Kong way of life. The 
lyrics mentioned how taboo and freedom of speech, conservatives and liberals, 
money and families co-exist in Hong Kong, and the most effective way to live 
happily is to sing-along. The last line reads, "True love in one family/ Affection is 
increasing". There the ritual appeared as the end shot. But one should note that 
from the start, the song was played along a sequence of news footage of 
demonstrations outside flag-raising ceremony on July 1. The images and the 
31 Anson Chan, the then Chief Secretary, expressed her personal feelings of how she found the 
flag-raising ritual on the first National Day of 1997 touching her, and made her embrace the return 
to China. But in the same speech, she immediately denied herself as becoming an apologist for 
China. The speech was delivered in Washington, and soon after she went back Hong Kong, she 
publicly clarified that the speech about the ritual has no political intention or sincere confession. 
“Passionate Light, (my translation; title originally in Chinese); A song of the artist Roman Tarn 
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music mutually responded to one another, creating a diffuse scenario of the 
handover ceremony, which similar to a happy-yet-problematic Hong Kong in the 
lyrics. This is the first time flag-raising ritual is used against a background 
resistant to its master narrative. 
July 1，2000: the news footage of the ritual is used to tag in the opening 
segment named "Hong Kong, the city of rage". A close-up of C.H.Tung was 
superimposed onto the image of ritual, leading in a rock-and-roll song called “I 
am the rage"^^ Thereafter, news footage of demonstration during the day were 
shown, with vox-pop of citizens in the rally expressing complaints to Tung and his 
government. The remaining program focused on the assessment of Tung 
performance since 1997. The narrative around flag-raising ritual is similar to that 
of the 1999 episode, juxtaposing the absolute totality of the ritual onto the 
resistance. Here, the narrative further creates an alignment of Tung (the 
government) with the ritual, and distant them with resisting public on a 
contrasting side. Despite the master narrative of the ritual remains unhindered, the 
ritual becomes a way to fix and identify the plight of the locals. The two extremes 
become dialectic to the post-1997 faces of Hong Kong people. 
July 6，2001: This narrative continues to prevail in the program against the 
social context of socio-political turmoil in recent years. In this episode, news 
footage of flag-raising does not appear until the second part of the show, entitled 
"A dream of direct election of Chief Executive". Here, the footage used is the 
longest among the seven analyzed episodes, as the performance and participation 
of Tung in the ritual becomes the guiding shots, a treatment very different from 
previous years, which simply highlight the physical features of hoisting the flags. 
Here, Tung was shown watching the hoisting of flags, shaking hands with the 
“Fury, (my translation; title originally in Chinese); A song of the band Beyond 
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public in the Square, one of who shouted "another five years (of tenure)!" to him. 
The shot is immediately adjoined to the scene of people shouting "one people one 
vote" in a demonstration for direct election during the week. The scene ends with 
a lyrics singing “I love an island with freedom/ I want to lock my eyebrows no 
more/ It's well enough for you and me to share”�*. In this way, the ritual is further 
pulled away from the vicinity of the Square, tightly aligned with the attacked 
government, and is kept a distance with the grudging public. The transition of 
subject matter from the ritual itself to the celebrity participants, or even to the 
general public outside the boundary of the sacred ritual, shows that the political 
legitimacy of the ritual is not sufficient to settle the full meaning of the ritual in 
the media discourse. Rather, it is through the political figures who participated it, 
that flag-raising ritual became connected to the locals - paradoxically, the 
connection is something about the disconnection of the "central power" (now a 
combined cultural icon of Tung and flag-raising) to the general public. 
July 6，2002: The calendrical ritual as the subject matter is further disrupted 
in this episode, as Anson Chan, the former Chief Secretary became the leading 
protagonist in a segment called "Is it so easy to 'talk'?". News footage of the 
ritual was shown but was to set the background for the faded-out political 
celebrity, who was described as an articulated and involving Hong Kong citizen 
(therefore attending the annual flag-raising ceremony), spoke up for the good of 
Hong Kong but was ignored and neglected by active government officials like 
Security Secretary Regina Ip^^. The ritual is used to highlight how Chan was 
marginalized to the political periphery despite she was once the core attendant of 
34 Dream of the Island, (my translation; title originally in Chinese); A song of the band The 
Wynners 
Chan commented on the low morale of the civil service and the newly implemented 
accountability system for principal officials. 
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the ritual36. 
July 4，2003: In previous years, the program discursively connected the 
ritual to highly localized issues and figures. Despite being a tool of the national 
building project, the icon is hardly attached to national issues, identities or 
transborder relations. Until 2003, mainland and Hong Kong was "CEPA-rised"^^ 
in the transborder political-socio-economical distance (see previous chapter), the 
ritual is used, for the first time, to converse with the discourse of "China". Premier 
Wen Jiabao visited Hong Kong amidst the local turmoil of SARS, Ordinance 23 
controversy and the July-1 rally. News footage of Wen watching and giving 
speech in the annual ritual was used, then cut to the signing ceremony of CEPA; 
quotes of Wen, before leaving Hong Kong in the week, were then edited together: 
"I love Hong Kong, I bless Hong Kong, I miss Hong Kong." A song was played in 
the background: "Who have been passionate to me with all his love/ Let's prove it 
with true love" . The ritual was once again brought back to a national discourse 
in which Hong Kong is the "local", relative to the "nation" to which the iconic 
ritual adhered. Strange enough, the political ritual's alignment to the national 
discourse should have settled right after its adoption in 1997，but now it is simply 
six years “late”. But if we take into consideration the specific approach of the 
program that converses with current discourses with the seemingly stable political 
icon, it is not surprisingly to witness the "return" of the ritual to the national level 
amidst the closing transborder distance in 2003. Again, the slippage of the ritual 
as a media icon enables it to enjoy diffuse significations. 
36 Chan made a surprise announcement in January 2001 that she would step down 14 months 
earlier than planned. Mrs Chan, whom Time magazine described as "the conscience of Hong 
Kong", was scheduled to retire in June 2002. 
37 Borrow from the signing of the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) between 
China and Hong Kong on June 2003, meaning a closer social, political, economical, and probably 
cultural distance (CEPA also covers cultural business like movie industry) between the two. 
38 Return Me True Love, (my translation; title originally in Chinese); A song of the artist Alan Tarn 
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In sum, Headliner's coverage of the ritual is a media routine, but owing to 
the nature of the program, the ritual becomes a highly localized identification to 
the post-1997 Hong Kong, a trajectory away from the original path of 
national-building. It is made possible by the rhetoric of montage that the program 
adopts. Mediatized ritual is more advantageous than live ritual in this way as it 
employs diversified rhetorical tools thus produces multiple narratives to converse 
with multiple interpretations of audience. It enjoys strong rhetorical force. 
Although the legitimacy of the ritual is enforced because of the habitual reportage 
it receives, the ritual becomes a media product with diffuse symbolic meanings 
that are quite different from its master narrative. From a historical moment in 
1997，it became a symbol of problematic patriotism of the locals in 1998; it then 
became effaced in front of the political figures without whose participations to the 
ritual, the ritual's full meanings cannot be realized. It is also a counter to Tung's 
tenure and to people's continual (dis-)satisfactions towards the government. The 
diffuse symbolic meanings are realized via resonating with the social context at 
that time, including public sentiments and discourses. In Singer's term (1972), the 
mediatized ritual in Headline” is reflective, casts light on "the ways in which 
cultural themes and values are communicated as well as on processes of social 
and cultural change." It is as well reflexive, for its strong active and creative 
agencies of changing representation of live ritual into diffuse symbols by which 
culture sees itself. 
TV viewing of mediatized flag-raising ritual is a virtually mandatory ritual of 
citizenship (Alexander & Jacobs 1998)，in which a cultural situation is created for 
a collective national identification. In this way, it seems that the power of 
instigating people to act (to enter the membership of citizens) is strong. But media 
researches in recent decades suggest a more ethnographical study on audience 
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reception, which makes assessing the performative strength of mediatized ritual a 
hard task without substantial audience research. As the resolution is yet to be 
absolute until further investigation, it is now marked as a moderate strength. But 
one thing for sure is that, solidarity continually forms and reforms the society, in 
which this media event serves as one of the communicative spaces for the 
"imaginative construction and reconstruction of more diffuse, but equally 
important, collective identities and solidarities." (ibid.) Diffusion also makes 
diversity possible, the multiple contents to which audience can identify away from 
the most sacred scene. Mediatized ritual is sacred for its room for imagination and 
interpretations in the co-existed project of solidarity. 
5.5.4 Voluntary Civic Program 
The standardization of ritual was crucial in the creation of a unified Chinese 
culture (Brownwell, 1995). Official flag-raising ritual is the focus of spectacle, an 
object of gaze, the expression of power, the totem of pilgrimage. Yet, when the 
ritual is to be conducted and operated by ordinary citizens in civic occasions, it 
becomes the focus and object of imitation (to keep up the standardization), the 
expression of allegiance (through hardship of training and performance), and as 
well an all-encompassing set of rules and structures (an unquestionable rhetoric, 
whoever，s disobedience denotes resistance). For the conduction of ritual is unlike 
the mere showing and hanging of national flag in authorized private premises, the 
civic program analyzed here is a full version of the political ritual follows its 
required rhetoric and rules of performance. On this stage, performing the ritual, 
that is, to raise the flag, has replaced mere attendance in the ritual, as the most 
expected and valued participations of ordinary citizens. 
There lies a wide variety of these civic performances in the society. A "new 
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tradition" for the public to grapple, civic national flag-raising ceremony appears in 
calendrical ceremonies held by organizations with mainland background (for 
example, the Kowloon Chamber of Commerce conducted their own ritual at their 
ofFice^^), and also, the District Offices all over Hong Kong. Wong Tai Sin, Kwai 
Tsing and Kowloon City are among those who have the practice of conducting 
their own ritual on July 1 and October 1，either in their own community town hall 
or outdoor playground. Yet, it is not a compulsory act for the Offices to do so. The 
practice is bond by but not required in the National Flag Ordinances. Usually, 
district offices' flag-raising will only be enhanced in "special timing" like the 
lO'h and 15th handover anniversaries in which marching will be performed. For 
anniversary in 2003, the ritual was a simplified version. Non-government 
organizations, residents and schools are invited; free drinks are provided. The 
ritual becomes a community gathering"^®. 
In the followings, two polarized case studies are chosen to provide an 
in-depth picture of the cultural power of the civic performances, one highly 
institutionalized and dependent on official guidance and scrutiny to realize the 
civic performance; another, highly autonomous. We will now turn to school 
flag-raising before moving on to representation in theatre arts. 
39 The ritual is not open to all but members of the Chamber and invited guests from the business 
sector, (telephone enquiry made on June 25，2003); 
4° Telephone interview to the District Offices on June 25, 2003 
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5.5.4a School Flag-raising 
Theory: Pedagogy and National-building 
Flag-raising in pedagogy is highly valued as one of the main feature of national 
education in the nation building project*�During the handover year, introduction 
of the ritual into schools as national education of anti-colonialism and anti-British 
thoughts was pushed forward by "pro-Beijing schools""^^. Official "flag-raising 
learning workshop" was held for 240 schools in Hong Kong in June 1997，just 
about to catch up with the handover. Four seminars were held in late 1998 by the 
then Educational Department on a generalized topic of "Understanding National 
Flag, National Anthem and Emblem, SAR Flag and Emblem". A VCD offered 
demonstration of the ritual was distributed to schools at the same time. These are 
necessary procedures of adaptation to the sovereignty transfer. But they are simply 
educational policies without being positioned as the necessary political principles, 
until the recent controversy about patriotism, that flag-raising in school has been 
picked up as subject of criticism under the nationalism discourse. 
Full enforcement of National Flag Ordinances, that is, to make school 
flag-raising compulsory, is urged in order to uplift the sense of nationhood among 
local students. The fact that after 1997, schools are only "encouraged" to raise 
national flag is blamed for the lack of national education and nourishment in the 
society, and for the resistance and lack of patriotism to the central government; on 
top of this is the recent development of seeing flag-raising at school as insufficient 
to boost national sentiment,� 
41 Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools, Curriculum Development Council, Educational 
Department: Hong Kong (1996, 1998) 
42 Ming Pao, July 2, 1997 
Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB) conducted a survey on the school 
practice of flag-raising ritual on the National Day of 2003. It shows that not more than 30% of the 
120 researched cases have raised the flag. DAB urged the government to boost up the practice and 
assist the school when necessary {Oriental Daily, June 9, 2003); representatives of Hong Kong 
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Truly, a notice issued from the then Education Department in 1998 stated that, 
"Education Department encouraged school to raise national and regional flag at 
school" on January 1, July 1 and October 1，"in order to improve students' 
knowledge about the nation and their sense of nationhood". However, the support 
that the government endows to the implantation is limited. Soon after 1997, it was 
a civic organization "Association of the Hong Kong Flag-guard", the first and so 
far the sole of this kind in Hong Kong, that has provided professional guidance for 
interested schools to conduct the ritual. The support includes flag-raising 
workshops to teachers, and assistance to set up flag-raising infrastructure at school 
including purchase of qualified national flags and poles. Chairman of the 
Association, Mr. Hui, is teaching in a "leftist" secondary school, which has a 
tradition of raising national flag even before 1997. According to him, school 
flag-raising is mostly a voluntary civic action without official support: 
“The only support from the Education Department was a CD-Rom offlag-raising 
demonstration issued to us in 1999. But the demonstration is not up to the 
standard. At that time, schools are interested but helpless. They did not even know 
how to buy a standardized national flag and other gadgets, not to mention how to 
conduct the ritual precisely. There is only one sole agent to supply national flag. 
As Hong Kong is different from China, the agent did not have enough stock for 
schools. At last, the government gave out national flag for every school but still 
they were the wrong size for standardized flag-raising ritual 
"I think it is only at school where the relationship between nation and students 
members of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference 
publicly criticized the lack of flag-raising ritual in local schools and urged the government to 
enforce the practice. {News Magazine, TVB, Feb 26, 2004; TVB evening news, March 8, 2004) 
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can be established. However, the schools do not know how to do. In the education 
reform, 'national identity ‘ has been in the agenda for a long time, it becomes a 
common language among us teachers. Still, there is no substantial program 
officially offered to us. It is useless for us to keep singing national anthem in 
music lessons, as it is simply like asking students to copy a book for ten times. 
What we need is an informative, cognitive and implemented task Education has 
been apolitical until 2002 when I heard about 'national education 'for the first 
time in the education system.“彳‘ 
True enough, to start national education from scratch in the wake of the 
handover is not an easy task. Hughes and Stone (1999) research on the nation 
building and curriculum reform in Hong Kong, and comment that under British 
rule, the education system was "de-politicizing...by presenting a conservative 
version of Chinese cultural tradition." After the handover, Chinese identity has to 
be imparted to school children, mainland Chinese educationalists have thus urged 
the government to modify and develop the curriculum to encourage "love of the 
country and nation, as well as education in proper social behaviour." But the fact 
is that Hong Kong has to face the development of a "multi-leveled conception of 
identity", in which the local and national references to their determining of 
identification may come into conflict. The tension between nation building and 
democratization has resulted in a "fundamental incompatibility" of the 
pedagogical aim of developing national identity among youngsters. Formation of 
national identity by official pedagogical strategies is a complex process. 
Hui admitted that his organization takes up responsibilities of a governmental 




“I think it is absolutely okay. I guess it is related to the changing society. People 
see the government differently nowadays; they are more self-initiated and 
voluntary. If we do it (promote flag-raising) in the past, we would have been 
finger-pointed for 'craving for political advantagesBut now, we complement the 
government from a civic perspective, I see it as an improvement.“ 
In sum, as a teacher and a professional in flag-raising ritual, Hui sees 
schooling as the most important and effective site to establish national identity for 
students via flag-raising ritual. For the ritual in the Bauhinia Square, he sees it 
only as a “commercial activity" for the sake of promoting local tourism, and has a 
less impact on national education. Since 1997，it is only until these one or two 
years that the educational system proliferate the ritual in high profile. 
Not surprisingly, it is not until 2003，that the National Flag, Emblem and 
Anthem of the People's Republic of China Exhibition, a regular display in the 
National Museum of China, Beijing, was on tour to Hong Kong for the first time, 
together with dynamic peripheral activities. Hui's organization was invited by the 
Education and Manpower Bureau (EMB) to co-ordinate seminar and to provide 
training for students as the tour-guide for the exhibition. Tours was arranged in 
two weekends during the handover anniversary period, for school teachers to visit 
the daily flag-raising ritual in the Bauhinia Square before heading to the 
exhibition. Institutional and civic cooperation is enhanced in the promotion of 
flag-raising ritual for national education. 
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Pr act ice: Performances of teachers and students 
About forty teachers attended the flag-raising workshop of Hui's organization on 
the day of interview. The workshop included a short seminar on the history and 
spirit of nationalism and national flag, the appropriate comportment for the ritual, 
practical flag-raising skills such as folding the flag and tying it onto the pole, 
marching exercise, and a quiz on the above; those who can pass the quiz could be 
awarded a certificate. 
As mentioned, flag-raising ritual becomes a subject of intimation when 
reduced to a civic dimension, as there is always the "most legitimate and rightful" 
ritual in the political level that scrutinizes, and that citizens should follow in order 
to retain its own legitimacy and its sincerity of expression of allegiance. In a 
series of workshops held in the past, Hui said the question that teachers eager to 
ask the most, is whether their performances are "up to the standard". They are 
eager and feel necessary to catch up with the "national standard" of paying respect 
to the nation. As a result, according to Hui, most teachers take the workshop more 
than once to ensure they acquire the standardized flag-raising skills. 
Not only does Hui's parade unit organize workshop for flag-raising training, 
EMB also offers occasional flag-raising courses for students. If flag-raising skills 
could be trained, improved and caught up with the recognized standard, will 
national affection be better in the same way as a result? Expectation of nourishing 
patriotism via flag-raising ritual in schools can turn out to be a different picture. 
The following case study exposes some of the "unexpected" slippages during a 
pedagogical fashioning of national sentiment. 
In Frank's discussion of a sociology of body (1991), three dimensions are 
thought to be essential in outlining the constitution of body: Institutions, 
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discourses and corporeality intersect to become an equilateral triangle to configure 
body. To follow this line of thoughts, flag-raising in post-1997 local schools can 
be examined in this way: school specifies the space and time of the bodily 
practices; pedagogy is the institutionalized force of construction. The site 
instantiates the discursive formation of nationhood of Hong Kong people under 
the one-country-two-system. Discourses on nationalization imply a cognitive 
mapping of the national body, its possibilities, limitations and experiences. The 
mapping is developed and lived out in juvenile bodies of students. The young 
flesh becomes the empirical body in the national building project. 
Field observation was conducted to CUHK FAA Chan Chun Ha Secondary 
School on their preparation and performance of flag-raising ritual for the National 
Day on October 1，2003. It covers two days of after-school rehearsals, and the 
ceremony on September It is a school of no particular political stance, and 
like most cases in the local schools, it only stages and develops the ritual and 
trains students to perform after 1997，with just six years of experience. A small 
group of students were sent to attend EMB's workshop three years ago, and the 
most outstanding one becomes the only "professional" flag-raiser at school and is 
now responsible to carry out the task every time. The flag-raiser, the teacher 
responsible for training, and the students taking part in the marching, are all under 
a disciplined body training, that is, the uniformed parade unit (the Boy Scout and 
the Girl Guide). An additional trainer from the Boy Scout headquarter is invited 
occasionally to help improve students' parade skills. 
While most of the rehearsal time has been spent on training the way to 
parade, raise flags properly and stand upright, teachers also mention frequently 
National Day is a school holiday so the school conducted the ritual a day earlier at morning 
assembly. 
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about the necessary emotions of the ritual. Teachers define the normal emotions as 
"don't move; don't laugh". This is how solemnity can be represented. The teacher 
once asked the flag-raiser, during an attempt in a rehearsal, "Why are you raising 
the flag with such a desperate look, locking your eyebrows?" Teachers can only 
set the normality by eliminating inappropriate/ pathologic emotions. At most, the 
teachers regulate appropriate attitudes in this way: 
"Flag-raising ceremony is very important, so we have to be attentive and pay no 
response to other happenings. Try to image how it is like when a sportsman is 
awarded on stage. The whole thing should be solemn.“ 
What the teachers concern is the required atmosphere of the event as a whole. 
Whether or not the students express patriotic feelings from their heart is less of a 
matter of concern. Emotions are performed to create the form which is well 
enough to make up sufficient content of the ritual. Patriotic feelings are 
embodiment only by the event, or at most, by the students' bodies as a 
performance (with observable in-cue and out-cue, start and end of the patriotic 
expression), but not individuals (in which affections are supposedly stable without 
termination). In such pedagogy of flag-raising, patriotic education has not been 
playing any significant role. 
Indeed, there are slippages of patriotic embodiment in local schools. Simply 
train the body to perform the correct emotions and create the right atmosphere, 
then flag-raising ritual can be accomplished. But in mainland it is always believed 
and conducted in, the vice versa. One has to embrace patriotism at heart, before 
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one can pay respect to the national flag with your body46. 
In the local case, however, teachers do not bother to check if students really 
affect the nation in a heart-felt way, or whether their gaze to the national flag is 
full of "love". Therefore, it is not surprising to note how teachers encourage 
students to practice harder by reasons of excellency instead of patriotism: "Our 
goal today (rehearsal) is to do it (flag-raising) to the most beautiful, then we can 
dismiss." 
In other conversations, teachers tend to use bodily metaphors to instruct 
students, to set exemplary for them to model upon. Again, the metaphors are 
• nothing but representations from popular culture. The discipline and nourishment 
for standardized national sentiment has nothing to do with patriotic body/ 
emotions. For example, when teachers instructed them to salute he said, "We are 
not from the circus or the Shaolin*?! You can't raise your arms too high." When he 
asked the parade team to fall in he raised arms to summon and said, "let's be the 
'Big Guy，!，’ 
What's more, the "achievement" that the flag-raiser has made does not 
contribute to any of his identification or affection with the nation, but a self-relief, 
as he exclaimed right after the September 30 ceremony, "finally I come to 
understand what it is meant by 'putting a stone aside'." The act is a burden instead 
of a glorification. Presumably, there lies a lack of nationalist passion in a 
“patriotic body" like the flag-raiser, that lies within (thus creates) the political 
ritual, without which the lack cannot be resolved in return. The lack of nationhood 
46 An appendix entitled "Basic knowledge of national flag" in the book Xin Shijiban Guoqixia De 
Jianghua (Speeches Under the National Flag) is a poem details how flag-raisers "use their hearts 
to raise the flag", and that their gazes to the flag is full of affections to the State. 
47 Both the circus and the Shaolin associate with harsh trainings and disciplines, but again, no 
nationalist feelings involved. 
48 He is imitating the image of pop-king Andy Lau raising two arms as a character in a recent local 
movie Karma. 
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is to be "filled" via ritualized actions and bodies. Presumably, this sense of 
nationhood is established and strengthened via flag-raising - buy it exists only 
during the performance and the lack will end as the body stops to perform when 
the ritual comes to a close. He is no longer "patriotic" and whether there is any 
more lack does not really matter thereafter until the next ritual comes. The lack of 
this problematised body is instrumental and ephemeral. 
To catch up with developing a sense of nationhood among students, teachers 
adopt the ritual as a form, an event to create a site of expression. However, the 
ritual is yet to have their own historical-cultural (or even ideological) 
accumulation of national affection that, in teaching a patriotic body there allows 
rupture in body-emotion alignment, there allows a less rigid form of bodily 
representation of patriotism. This echoes the way too far to an ideal nationalist 
call, whose ideological making is still uncompleted in the local mind/body. 
More interestingly, students and teachers attempted their own way to conduct 
the ritual. Slippage occurs in the re-presentation of such absolute and legitimated 
political ritual. 
Once, both the teachers and the students were uncertain about the timing of 
spreading out the flag on the pole. Supposedly this significant move should be 
matched with the national anthem but no one at that time was sure about which 
bars to follow. They started to argue, asking for answers, when the flag-raiser 
publicly defied the teachers' decisions. At last, they came up with a resort together 
but they were still unsure about the correct procedures. 
The resort to their query was finally made under uncertainty and speculation. 
The teachers asked others for help (including me and the students) to confirm the 
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appropriate bar in the anthem. Even though the team has been shown the EMB 
educational CD-ROM, and even though one of the coaches was asked to recall his 
experience of watching the Tiananmen Square's ritual, the teachers were unsure 
about the correct procedures. They realized the ritual in trial and error, probably 
with modifications upon their own abilities; despite they model upon official 
exemplary of the ritual. 
In sum, the staging of flag-raising in this case can be regarded in various 
aspects: 
1. The form of the ritual counts more significantly than its content; 
2. National education exercises in the ritual but it does not necessarily carry out 
surveillance and regulation to students' national sentiment; 
3. The ritual mediates between modeling-upon and making-up. 
In other words, there always exists a slippage of enforcement and 
representation of a patriotic flag-raising ritual at school, leading to a rather 
ambivalent quality of this national ritual, thus leading to the equally ambivalent 
identification with the nation. The content of identification, at the same time, 
maps out and limits the performance of anyone to be seen as patriotic in the 
ephemeral routine of raising the flag. The new association produced in this staging 
of ritual is the embodiment of an unfixed sense of nationhood; national identity is 
still under the making, in this case, against the master narrative of the ritual that 
teachers and students are so keen on to learn and catch up with. 
The triangular force of discourses, institutions and body that Frank has 
discussed, is transposed here into a three-fold mediation between ritual, identity 
and body. The ambivalence in the nationalization of Hong Kong discursively 
allows (and also limits) practices of national ritual in pedagogy, which in turn 
reinforces national identification and a try-to-be-patriotic body both of a hazy sort. 
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It can be docile and inventive at the same time. In relocating the sense of 
nationhood for the decolonized Hong Kong, the national building project in the 
local young flesh is yet to be completed and affirmed to reach its mainland 
exemplary. 
In this way, the cultural power of the school staging, following Schudson's 
delineation, appears to be highly performative, institutionally retained, but 
ambivalent in terms of its rhetorical power and resonance to the present 
pedagogical discourses. 
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5.5.4b Representation in Art 
As discussed, flag-raising ritual has become the contingent signifier of national 
identity, and the various socio-political issues in the post-1997 era. Mobilization 
of this symbol in art representations participates in the significatory process, 
working within and also making up the socio-political discourse of the ritual. 
Artistic license allows, and is dependent on creativity. By creativity Kaprow 
(1993) defines it as risk-taking. What could possibly be the “risk，，for artists? 
Artwork crosses the borderline of the private and public sphere, expresses 
individual thoughts but is also placed into, and conversing with the society. Artists 
are regarded as the "organic intellectuals" who are always "on the move, on the 
make, constantly interacting with society and struggling to change minds and 
expand markets." Artwork is resistance as in its ability to take risk of upsetting the 
moral status quo. (Becker, 2002:14) Introducing flag-raising ritual in artistic 
expression is not an official program. In contrast with schooling, art is a rather 
autonomous field. (Bourdieu, 1993) 
Local fashion designer Peter Lau who tailored a controversial line of fashion 
design in 1997，featuring the red five-star flag, has demonstrated how far artistic 
signification can go against structural meaning of a national symbol. “I intend to 
revolutionize the aloofness and political implication that the national flag conveys, 
into a feminine representation of the beautiful co-existence of strength and 
tenderness," said Lau.49 However, Lau became "one of the first cultural sector 
victims of the changed legal environment" (Clarke, 2001: 193), as the Trade 
Development Council, organizer of Lau's fashion show, warned the designer not 
to break the new national flag law; Lau's clothing with red flags were withdrew. 
In a way, the field of artistic production is vulnerable to political scrutiny. 
Pao, iune 30，1997 
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The following investigation is a case study on a local theatre practitioner who 
frequently adopts flag-raising in his work in manner similar to Lau. Yet, the 
scrutiny that this artist received is comparatively less fierce than that of Lau. One 
of the possible reasons is that he is working on alternative arts of lesser 
recognizable social significance, whereas Lau's design is located in a 
commercialized and mainstream fashion market, and that his fashion show is 
highly institutionalized (support by governmental organization). Yet, it is beyond 
the scope of this research to investigate the relationships between art and politics. 
The following offers a textual analysis on the artistic representation of the ritual 
which possibly turns the ritual into a diffusing symbol. 
1997 has been regarded as the latest threshold in the localization of Hong 
Kong theatre art, in which some theatre troupes have connected themselves to the 
social arena and raised specific concerns on the identity issues, though they are 
only among the minority. (Xiaoxi, 1999) From 1997 to 2002, Shu Ning 
Presentation Unity (SNPU), a self-funded small-scale troupe, has staged twelve 
theatre productions, in which four of them have used flag-raising ritual in a 
dramaturgical Hui Shu-ning, the artistic director of the group and also the 
director of these productions, admits his consistent use of the imagery and relates 
it to the result of his socio-political concerns in his artistic expressions^^ It is not 
surprising to see how SNPU has been regarded as having a grass-rooted 
stylization acclaimed for its witty political satire. (Leong, 2004) 
Hui does not simply stage the ritual in a way exactly the same with the 
real-life situation. He re-presents it with narratives and symbolic meanings very 
I have participated in all of the analyzed productions as performer except the video. The 
analysis and informations obtained comes from both the interview with Hui and personal 
observations during the creative processes. 
51 Interview made on February 27.2004. 
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different from that conveyed by the master narrative of the political ritual. And it 
is proven that only on the stage of artistic endeavors that such autonomy could be 
tolerated without punity. Legitimacy is not a matter of concern. 
In The Ku-fung Master (1999)52，^ flag-raising ritual is staged but only some 
mobile phones are "hoisted" - performers with mobile phones lift their arms and 
their gadgets, while the national anthem is played at the background; a narrator in 
his shouts is presenting government officials like Anson Chan and Tung Chee-wah. 
Hui explains, "I admit it is designed to be a satire, very ironic to the political 
situation at that time^^. But I have to emphasize that I am not putting my finger at 
the ritual itself. It is only the individuals, the government officials, whom I want 
to criticize." 
One year later, Hui stages another performance, entitled The Idlers (2000)54. 
Contrary to his last production, the staging of the ritual bears a more "positive" 
implication. “I want to maintain the solemnity of the ritual. I ask the performers to 
do it seriously. We want to show people our respect to the ritual." What happens 
on stage is that, a piece of popular Mandarin song "The Happy Excursion" has 
replaced the national anthem as the background music while performers raise their 
“flags，,一this time, no mobile phones but pieces of ping-pong rackets. Performers 
lift their arms and their rackets, switching the double-sided gadgets from black to 
red (the colour of China). At last, there creates an imagery of a sea of red, a 
symbol of the national flag. 
"This is a way to express my emotions to the motherland. But I intentionally 
use this song, because I still think that there is no total freedom here (in Hong 
“ M y translation; performance title originally in Chinese((黃飛鴻三打古惑仔》） 
The theme of the performance is to contemplate the meaning of "heroes" in present times. 
Government officials are among the subject of investigation. 
54 My translation; performance title originally in Chinese:《行行企企食飯兩味》 
-114 -
Kong)." The song borrows the philosophy of Zhuangzi in "The Happy Excursion", 
and expresses that “be it sorrow or suffering, as long as one can live freely, 
nothing else matters."^^ 
From a rather implicit and metaphorical representation of flag-raising by the 
substitute of mobile phones, to a more direct and embracing manner to re-stage 
the ritual "in red", Hui plays with the slippage of signification and reload 
flag-raising as a symbol with diffuse implications. In 2001，he furthers applies the 
symbol with resistance. 
In response to the fifth anniversary of the Hong Kong handover, SNPU 
presents an exhibition and a video screening at the Hong Kong Arts Centre on 
June 24 and July 1 2001，entitled Punches for the Five Years.^^ A happening was 
staged as the opening event, in which four performers carried out a "flag-raising 
ritual” and a "flag-burning ritual". Before the event, SNPU has released 
information to the mass media about how they will bum national flag in the act. 
That attracted the press to come for the spectacles. During the act, a piece of red 
cloth is used but the artist has wittingly prepared only four yellow stars to be put 
on the cloth, making it a "to-be-national flag". In the end, they burnt the "flag" in 
the lobby of the premise, but have successfully avoided legal persecution covered 
by the National Flag and National Emblem, and Regional Flag and Regional 
Emblem ordinances. “This time, it is a complaint, a release of dismay towards the 
national flag controversy at that time."^^ 
55 Coincidentally, a mainland filmmaker Jia Zhangke released a movie of the same Chinese name 
in 2003，in which a restaurant named "Red Flag" appeared as the major setting. The movie, 
"Unknown Pleasure", is about modem China under the corruption of consumerism, and the red 
flag was considered the symbol of modem China. 
“ M y translation; performance title originally in Chinese:《五年欠打》 .The title plays pun with 
a colloquial phrase (meaning “You deserve rebuke because of your five traits in your destiny."); 
Now, the title suggests "You deserve rebuke because of your deeds in these five years". It is 
obvious that the production posits itself in a criticizing point-of-view against the status quo. 
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Under the context of artistic expression, the act cuts off itself from any other 
act of demonstration. It distorts the national symbol with impunity, a treatment 
very different from that of the protesters who burn the flag on the street. 
Yet, to see it in another way, Hui's so-called "flag desecration" was not 
without scrutiny and piinity, though it did not come from the legitimate 
governmental institutions but the art institution. Hong Kong Arts Centre was not 
informed of the burning act before hand, and has decided to bar SNPU from doing 
the same act again on their next performance on July 1. But the bar is never 
political, Hui said, as it was only the safety reason that Arts Centre deployed. It 
was against the fire regulation to use fire indoors in the premise. 
On the same event, an independently made video of the same name was 
screened. Footage of the grand flag-raising ceremony on the handover day in 1997 
was used in the video. "The story goes as someone wants to assassinate Tung 
Chee-wah. Sometimes I think it would be great if everything can start all over 
again...to achieve this is to have him assassinated, and the best timing to start 
things over is right at the handover flag-raising ceremony," said Hui. He endows 
the ceremonial ritual with political significance of a resisting nature. 
The consistent use of national flag-raising in SNPU productions is not 
without reason. Well-known for the explicit political satire, SNPU productions 
converse with current affairs and public sentiment of the society. The national 
ritual becomes a fluid symbol with diffuse signification, in which a very strong 
identification can be found, that is, a highly localized identification of the 
China-Hong Kong relationships. At one point the symbolic ritual points at 
complaints towards the new SAR government, at another, a national bonding with 
localized crave for freedom; at most, it becomes an expression of anger and 
protest by voluntary self-destruction. Flag-raising can never receive more 
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diversified and multiple identifications than on this stage of representation. 
In this way, one can look at the cultural power of SNPU dramaturgical use of 
the national ritual in this way: the self-funded group has neither institutional 
backup nor censorship. The official organizers of the productions, the Leisure and 
Cultural Services Department and the Hong Kong Arts Centre are merely 
venue-providers, and did not interfere with the creative process or censor the 
content of performances. The putting up of the productions is highly autonomous 
and self-determining. Interference, at most, comes out of administrative reasons. 
Institutional retention is thus low. , 
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subsidized Hong Kong Repertory), SNPU is neither a commercial nor established 
troupe, though popular among young people, alternative theatre circle and 
religious sectors^^ SNPU figures reveal an average of 90% attendance for these 
productions, though actual headcounts are no more than 4000. The reach is low, 
not surprising for any other group who engages in alternative art. Going to 
alternative theatre is not a major cultural activity in Hong Kong. Interestingly 
enough, it is the specificity of the genre that produces a collective of specific 
audience. People willing to attend their productions are more likely to fall into the 
same cultural frame of the artists, to respond sensitively to the artistic rhetoric, 
and to decode the text using a similar significatory system. The connection of 
SNPU to their audience is proved by their consistently high attendance rate. The 
instigation of any action by the performances is ephemeral, lies within the specific 
time and space only during the performances. That is to say, similar to the case of 
ritual, participation is already the action taken. Watching performances, 
interpreting the speak-up artists, reading the artistically refined imagery and signs, 
are the resolution of this cultural performance. The resolution is highly 
performative. But in the end, its cultural power of communicating the slippage of 
flag-raising as an unfixed sign or at most a resistance to the socio-political status 
quo, is relatively weak owing to the low level of reach in the population. 
SNPU has demonstrated a possible reproduction of the symbolic meaning of 
flag-raising ritual without institutional support or prohibition. The ritual reckoned 
here is not an official program but a creative representation of localized 
sentiments towards Hong Kong and China via a dramaturgical reinvention of the 
political ritual. 
58 SNPU started as a troupe using theatre arts as a means to preach; still, after establishing itself as 
a professional theatre troupe, they publicly retains the identity of being a Christian group. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
Flag-raising ritual is performed on different stages, where both locals and 
mainlanders participate into these cultural performances of Chinese identities in 
the post-1997 Hong Kong. "Tourist Spectacle" is a unique stage that painstakingly 
exposes the political and economic dependency of the local on the State, of Hong 
Kong's self-identification in perpetual relation to mainlanders. It is the exemplary 
of the commercialization of a cultural act and symbol. "Recurrent Calendrical 
Event" is a stage where the most legitimate Chinese could be located. It offers the 
exemplary performance of a national identity via taking part into the ritual. The 
symbolic political significance of the ritual is persistently enforced onto the locals. 
It also has the most institutional advantages to settle in the local culture than any 
other stages. Therefore, it is the authoritative institutionalization of a cultural act 
and symbol, right as opposite to "Media Event" as an autonomous 
institutionalization which allows a slippage of its dominating political-cultural 
definitions. Mediatized ritual is as dominant as the calendrical event in the stage 
of "Media Event". Together with the calendrical event, the two are the new spaces 
of a collective and forcefully narrated identification of national identity. Yet, 
mediatized ritual offers even more multiple Sino-Hong Kong identification as the 
mediatization process allows slippage of the ritual's symbolic meaning. 
Mediatized ritual is more reflexive to the postcolonial culture. Lastly, there are 
multi-sites of "Voluntary Civic Programs", both seemingly dependent on the 
performative ability to maintain the power of a cultural act and symbol. From 
highly institutionalized to highly autonomous, the cases of the school and the 
artistic representations in which the ritual is conducted, suggest that national 
identity can well be taught, mocked, creative, and after all, performed. 
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The cultural power of these performances vary, correspond to how 
institutionalized and legitimate they are, how much slippage they enjoy in 
conveying the symbolic meanings of the ritual, and how appealing they are to 
invite further act-out of local identities. At the same time, the identity 
performances on these stages can be mutually conflicting or enhancing. "Media 
event" seems to have the most comprehensive strength of all, suggesting that 
mediatized ritual is more embedded into the daily lives of the locals. But its 
strength is in fact dependent on the "real" ritual; the stage to conduct live ritual, 
such as "calendrical event" and "schooling" are essential for the ritual to receive 
standardization and endorsement from the national force, thus to retain its 
symbolic political significance. "Tourist spectacle" continues to mark the 
difference between "locals" and "Chinese", leading to a complex representation of 
the local identity; its disconnection with the locals continues to negotiate and 
conflict with the national building project that "calenderical event" and 
"schooling" tries hard to enhance. On the other hand, it is shown that flag-raising 
does not necessarily align with a national goal. As a cultural performance, 
flag-raising can be both reflective to the social settings, and reflexive to it. It is 
believed that flag-raising is more than persuasive formulations, but occasions in 
which a culture or society reflects upon and defines itself, present with 
alternatives, and may eventually change in some ways while remaining the same 
in others. (MacAloon 1984) Artistic representation of the ritual, as well as the 
slippage of signification in mediatized ritual, has provided an imaginary space for 
creative resistance to the master narrative of the ritual; the meaning construction is 
unfixed, and keeps changing creatively and responsively. In the end, the slippage 
cannot change anything of the master narrative because the latter has such a 
strong political back-up, but at least, it can suggest more ways to see people's 
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relationship and interactions with flag-raising, and refract the exciting scene of 
identity negotiation that takes place under the red five-star flag. 
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Chapter Six Conclusion 
"The real transition has been much more complex, subtle and profound. In many 
ways, it has asked more of us than we expected. That is because the real transition 
is about identity, and not sovereignty [...] what I am doing is acknowledging who 
and what I am.“ 
As mentioned in previous chapters, in 1998，the then Chief Secretary Mrs. 
Anson Chan presented a controversial speech in Washington on her nationalist 
feeling and emotive response to the flag-raising ritual, eleven months since the 
1997 handover. Late on the evening of June 30，1997，she said, between the 
lowering of one flag and the raising of another - in that instant when Hong Kong 
seemed truly without identity - identity became the issue. "That was one of the 
handover's defining moments and is the challenge Hong Kong faces today." She 
continued, the search for identity "will ultimately make us a more united and 
democratic society."' 
"Hong Kong transition is about identity, not sovereignty," Chan said. To 
study nationalism in a postcolonial context is obliged to reckon the decolonized 
states as the transitory territories. What Anson Chan has pointed out for Hong 
Kong is that, being in the states of transition, identity becomes the issue; having 
multiple identities in attendance and negotiation, nationalism thus becomes the 
problematic. 
6.1 Nationalization meets Localization, the Multiple Processes 
In practice, the re-nationalization of Hong Kong via the ritualistic act of national 




flag-raising can be considered as a complex process. Empirical data in this study 
elucidates that, the settlement of the ritual in Hong Kong is in fact an on-going 
product of the encounter between nationalization and localization. From a state of 
postcolonial confusion since Hong Kong's decolonization, to the settlement of a 
sterilized nationalistic embrace, nation building via flag-raising is never an 
expressway. It is reflected in the rapid development of the ritual: 
Since 1997，the ritual has entered a "stage of ambivalence"; it has not 
received an immediate settlement to the official political culture and the people's 
lives. Rather, it has experienced ambivalent positioning owing to a discourse split. 
Both the daily and the annual ritual are disconnected to local culture: the former is 
a routine disregard of the presence of audience; the latter excludes the public but 
not politicians, officials and carefully selected citizens. In other words, the locals 
are basically excluded from both physical and symbolic participation to the ritual. 
At the same time, its symbolic political power was intentionally suppressed to 
maintain the image of "one-country-two-system". Schools slackly performed the 
ritual as national education. Public institutions hurried to remedy and raised the 
flag but in the wrong way.^ 
Later, the ritual becomes a commercial tool to pass Hong Kong as Chinese 
for the sake of economic survival. The official decision to turn the daily routine 
into a tourist spectacle has brought it into a "stage of mimicry", where Hong Kong 
attempts to learn to be Chinese by the ritualistic performance. 
Not for long, mounting State surveillance, and closer economic and cultural 
ties between mainland and Hong Kong have led to a retroacting of political origin 
of the ritual. In this "stage of relocation", the ritual is re-positioned to become 
2 Sing Tao Daily, October 4，1997. A branch of Chiyu Bank was discovered hoisting the national 
flag in a reversed way on the National Day. 
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again a nationalist necessity. 
These three stages, however, do not bring the ritual's development into a 
closure, nor will the ritual be developed continuously along a linear trajectory. 
The possibilities of how the ritual will be manifested and utilized in the future by 
both the political and cultural force are beyond the speculations of the data in the 
project. To the extremes, at least we could say, the conveyance of absolute 
affection and allegiance to the nations will be in its gradual replenishment, and 
that the local ritual will be standardized with the mainland execution, 
accomplishing a political will of affirmation. On the probable contrary, the 
manifestation of the ritual will receive even more slippage, become more multiple 
or resisting. The dynamics of the variable in control of these possibilities come 
from the Sino-Hong Kong relations and the changing historicity of Hong Kong. 
Still, these three stages together make up the path of the ritual's localization 
that carries out a negotiated version of Hong Kong's nationalization. The 
negotiations between the stable master narrative of flag-raising ritual, the 
ambivalence of Hong Kong towards resinicization, and the shifting national 
stance of central surveillance to Hong Kong affairs, thread through the path of the 
ritual's localization; how the master narrative of the ritual is emptied out and later 
refilled in the course becomes the sub-plot of the nationalization process. 
Hong Kong's nation building is not an instantaneous accomplishment; the 
national identity of Hong Kong is not embedded in people's mind in a sudden and 
incontestable manner. The nation building project, as reflected by the 
development of the ritual, requires a process, that is, a localization of nationalism, 
which in the course of its re-utterance, is subject to mutation and interruption. 
123 
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6.2 National Identity Performance: the Multiple Adaptations 
What has Hong Kong been experiencing in this form of localized nationalization? 
In the study, observations are made in the multiple sites where the ritual is 
performed. 
The ritual is shown to be more than an annual official act of ceremony. It is 
also established as an image-building strategy of tourism where the ritual becomes 
a tourist spectacle. It is institutionalized in the educational system, and it is a 
media product of diffuse symbolic meanings and polysemic interpretations. These 
create the multiple stages on which national identity is performed, but in various 
manners in response to the very stage that people act on, resulting in the various 
identity performances. The different cultural power and communicative strength 
of these multiple stages, have resulted in the negotiation of these multiple identity 
performances on the valid and legitimated cultural positioning of Hong Kong. 
In other words, the national identity performance of Hong Kong does not 
come out of a single version but are different adaptations upon their participations 
into different sites. 
Since 1997, people's simultaneous embrace and resistance to the State power 
results in the ambiguous positioning of the newly imported national ritual. It is the 
official intention to cover up the ritual's explicit symbolic State power for a 
utilitarian sovereignty transition and the maintenance of a capitalist, perpetually 
apolitical Hong Kong not different from the past; it was set up as a low-key daily 
routine with suppressed political implications. David Clarke (2001:202) precisely 
observes it is "little more than a movement of flags down and up poles." Despite it 
articulates the most legitimacy and performs the exemplary of a national identity 
during the recurrent calendrical celebration, it is still highly disconnected with the 
local culture. Though it is institutionalized by the police force responsible for the 
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ritual, it is not significantly recognized and slackly executed in other institutions 
like schooling. The ritual is institutionalized from the start but not the act of 
national identity performance. 
On the other hand, mediatized ritual continually reproduces uncritically the 
symbolic meaning of the ritual in the calendrical celebration. But soon, despite the 
media is the important state apparatus "in the national struggle for discursive 
representation, especially on issues of identity, interest and ideology" (Pan et al., 
2001), mediatized ritual demonstrates negotiations between a stable representation 
of the ritual's master narrative and the changing contextual circumstances, 
rendering it a diffusing, heterogeneous and reflexive media product. 
One of these changing contextual circumstances is when the ritual was 
turned into a tourist spectacle. 
The ritual's political wealth has given way to its economic potential of 
re-positioning the decolonized Hong Kong. It gradually expanded towards a 
trajectory of the commercialization of Chinese national identity. The decision to 
turn the ritual into a "tourist spectacle" has brought the ritual into a mimicry, in 
which “being Chinese" is consumed by both mainland tourists and Hong Kong 
people for economic survival. Hong Kong attempts to pass as Chinese via the 
ritual but still in a rather commercialized and apolitical setting. 
The cultural power of this tourist spectacle comes into direct negotiation to 
that of the calendrical ritual, in terms of the more effective way for Hong Kong to 
pass as Chinese and achieve a more valid cultural positioning for the decolonized 
soil. Negotiation, if not competition between the two, also appears in media 
representation. The commercialization of the Chinese identity is getting to become 
the leading index of people's identification. The political economy of the 
reciprocal Sino-Hong Kong identification is exposed. 
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However, as the commercialization of the Chinese national identity exercises 
a strong local subjectivity in the course, increasing State surveillance finally 
intrudes. Closer Sino-Hong Kong relationships have suggested that, steps should 
be taken to further institutionalize the Chinese national identity. That means it is 
necessary to retroact the ritual's political origin that has been lurking in the 
background for too long. Hong Kong is reminded by the national force that, 
"being Chinese" can be more than just commercial performances, but a 
mechanism of nation building. 
National force breaks in the localization process of the ritual. Institutions like 
schools are reconsidered as the appropriate stages to conduct the relocation of the 
ritual's master narrative and symbolic power. Schools are later not only 
encouraged, and somehow pressurized by pro-China camps to enforce 
substantially the national ritual alongside national education. This becomes a kind 
of re-institutionalization of identity. The re-introduction of pedagogy as the latest 
relocated institutionalization of identity thus requires much more regulatory effort 
such as standardization, in order to make up the slack performance in the past few 
years. Institutional support and regulatory mechanisms to ensure the well-fitting 
of ritual and pedagogy is only about to become substantial. 
Similarly, institutionalized elements are further introduced to the 
ritual-cum-tourist spectacle. Cultural exchanges with the mainland army force are 
conducted to balance its commercial flavors. More important is the scrutiny that 
the national identity performance in the tourist spectacle has received. Via 
criticism from pro-China camps and comparisons to the national version of ritual 
in Beijing, the supposedly commercialized spectacular has to succumb to political 
inspections, gradually relocating itself back on track of an apt national ritual. All 
these are responsive to the closing of the Sino-Hong Kong distance and the 
126 
-131 -
mounting of the State intervention to local affairs, times of which identification to 
the locals is further marginalized, of which nation building project is finally 
recognized rather than eschewed. 
6.3 Contemplation 
Despite nationalism as the strong institutional force, the manifestations of 
flag-raising ritual are multiple, and that its cultural power are derived from, at the 
same time, authoritative and autonomous institutionalization, commercialization, 
and performative spectacles. To further probe into such multiplicity some features 
can be described, which become the specificities of this “Hong Kong-style 
national ritual": (1) national ritual is both an asset and a burden to Hong Kong. In 
the former, this "new tradition", introduced in the wake of a historical twist, 
brings in a new dimension of identification by which Hong Kong re-invents and 
re-images herself as a Chinese city. The highly commercialized implementation of 
the national ritual is crucial to achieve a win-win situation between her economic 
and political survival in face of China. It is done for the sake of utilizing 
nationalism for her own good; (2) As a burden, the implementation of the national 
ritual has been inviting resistance from both the institutional level and the civilian 
level. Both technically and emotionally, people find it hard to catch up with a 
nationalistic manifestation of solemnity and patriotism via the ritual; they might 
not have the cultural understanding to conduct a wholly standardized ritual, nor do 
they have the necessary sentiment (and being critical) of embracing the nation in 
their ritualistic participation. Worse still, this act of "catching up" is still regarded 
by some parts in the society as the pragmatic deeds of "apologists". This kind of 
burden/resistance is unlike the violent resistance of burning national flag as a way 
to stand against the authority, so commonly found in almost every democratic 
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country. Rather, it is a burden of finding a way to locate national identification in 
the localized cultural vicinity. The asset and the burden have created a continual 
reconfiguration of the ritual, as long as identity negotiation prevails. (3) For this 
reason, another specificity of the ritual is that, it has yet come to a closure of 
affirmed manifestation. Rather, it is subjected to readjustment and negotiation of 
its form (the performance) and content (the utilization). The dynamics of changes 
come from the variable of the changing Sino-Hong Kong relations and the 
historicity of Hong Kong. The variable stands against the constant of a 
nationalistic narrative of flag-raising, which has once been emptied out in Hong 
Kong but now under gradual replenishment. Yet, how the variable will lead the 
trajectory of flag-raising in Hong Kong is waited to be seen. 
These multiplicities are made possible by the unique historicity of Hong 
Kong, which gives her a structural ground to allow the above developments and 
predictions. Structurally, under the one-country-two-system, flag-raising ritual is 
the perpetual mark of difference for Hong Kong and China. This means the 
standardization of the national ritual needs to go through a different and difficult 
path in face of the local force in respects of the historical, cultural, social and 
political, as exhibited by the fact that a flag-raising ritual will be uncompleted 
without the SAR flag. Yet, the fact that in the ritual, the SAR flag can never share 
an "equal footing" (the SAR flag has to arrive the vertex of the pole later in time 
and lower in height than the national flag) exhibits the difficulty of such power 
negotiation. 
Also, the contextualization of endo-colonialism imposed by China to Hong 
Kong is another structural reason leading to the multiplicity of the ritual. This 
historical specificity has deferred Hong Kong from her departure of 
postcoloniality, and created for her a distinctive definition of re-nationalization. 
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For Hong Kong, national ritual is paradoxically a celebration of national 
sovereignty and a display of her perpetual colonization. 
Borrowing from Bhabha's conception of colonial mimicry (Bhabha, 1994), it 
is said that Hong Kong performs to be Chinese via the performance of ritual, 
embraces nationhood (to pass as Chinese) and retains one's own subjectivity (to 
offer her Chinese identity for consumption) at the same time. But unlike Bhabha's 
thought, this kind of mimicry is far from being subversive, as Bhabha initially 
proposes this act to the postcolonial world against their colonizers. "Profitable" 
nationalism has replaced disruptive postcolonial strategy in helping Hong Kong to 
locate her shifting boundaries of identity. Or to put it in another way, Hong Kong 
has created a postcolonial strategy of her own definition for the hybridization of 
her colonial reminiscence and nationalism. The strategy is a painstaking response 
to the complex endo-colonialism occurs between China and Hong Kong. The road 
to her settlement of the implanted nationalism also equals to a struggle of her own 
boundary setting of identity. Her final homeliness would be in perpetual deferral 
as long as endo-colonialism prevails. 
Bhabha's contention that postcoloniality is disruptive, "strange, empowering 
knowledge", ‘‘schizoid and subversive" (Bhabha, 1990:319), is here offered 
another possibility. In a way, what decolonization and postcoloniality mean to 
Hong Kong is not only a historical opportunity of liberation or self-rediscovery. It 
suggests an inevitable historical recurrence of her capitulation to another (endo) 
colonial authority, of her surrender to co-optation by which her very own survival 
could only be sustained — the very same thing she has been doing since her 
colonization as early as some 150 years ago. 
Hence, the local subjectivities that prevail in the localization of the ritual 
should not only be regarded as some kinds of postcolonial rebound, but also the 
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historical product of Hong Kong's longstanding hybridity that causes her to 
persistently struggle for an identity and continued existence in pragmatic 
consideration of her political and social vicinities. 
That is why it is not surprising to see that, when a strong national discourse 
finally breaks in the localization of ritual in recent years, local subjectivity does 
not react with resistance but submission, resulting in the relocation of the ritual's 
political origin and re-institutionalization of national identity. But as it is pointed 
out earlier, the shifting balance of power between China and Hong Kong and the 
prevailing critical views towards national sentiments in the local, have the 
potential force to guide the ritual towards a direction otherwise. 
In sum, nationalization has been encountering irregular identity performance 
produced in the multiple sites of the ritual; an erratic path of conveyance of the 
ritual's master narrative is thereby produced. All these have come into terms with 
the fact that, flag-raising ritual does not come out of a single stage of performance, 
but of the multiple sites that get together to make up unique meanings specific to 
how local people identify with their own nation. This answers more profoundly to 
the relationships between symbolic communication and nationalism. 
What's more，the multiple staging of flag-raising ritual in nation building 
echoes what theorists believe in nationalism as a mode of representation, as the 
means of social engineering highly dependent on the use of narratives and symbol 
systems with tailored discourse, so as to re-create and narrate a sense of -
collectivity among people. The political destination of the nation building project 
is where sterilized national affection and allegiance will embody people's 
identification to China in their participation of the ritual. By then, national identity 
will be ritualized. Ritualization creates and requires habitual response for the 
people to react with a stylized language and behaviour in a ritual, a way deemed 
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necessary in conveying one's own identity, a way without which a nation could 
not be sustained in the imaginary continuum. 
"Hong Kong has yet to find an identity that it is comfortable with. Some 
would have us disown our past. Others seem oblivious to the fact that, while 
embracing 'one county', it is the 'two systems ‘ that sets Hong Kong apart from the 
mainland. The vast majority of Hong Kongers are proud to be Chinese [...]” 
As long as the ritual raises two flags at a time, it remains the perpetual mark 
of difference between the nation and the local. However, as we have seen in the 
nationalization process carried out by the ritual, the compatibility of the Hong 
Kong local identity and the national identity is coming into shape. In this way, the 
perpetual mark of difference uttered by the ritual will be steered towards the 
production of changing meanings for the "one-country-two-systems". Identity 
performance in the national ritual of flag-raising will be in continual 
re-configuration as one of the unique Hong Kong experiences of her 
postcoloniality. 
3 Anson Chan, "Trust Us", in Time Magazine, June 14，2004，Vol. 163 No. 23. This article starts 
with Chan asking "Is there much to celebrate" the 7& handover anniversary of Hong Kong, and 
describes the present Hong Kong political situation as a reminder of the Cultural Revolution. This 
sparked off a series of attack against her from Beijing and the Pro-China camps in Hong Kong. 
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